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# EASTERN

**F.O.  
371**

1947



PALESTINE

File No. 46

pp. 11011 - 11293

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61795

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*E 11014/46/31*

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774

E

2

E 11011

PALESTINE

24 Nov.

Registry Number E 11011/46/31  
TELEGRAM FROM

No. U.K. No. 1

Dated New York.

Received in Registry 3508  
24 Nov  
24 -

Iraq Petroleum being ~~be accepted~~  
In view of success resulting to effect that it may  
be unadvisable to negotiate concession favourable  
to itself and to inappropriate the work of the  
Petroleum Dept. Suggest that negotiations with  
I.P.C. for new oil concessions be postponed.

Last Paper.

E 10953

References  
E 10813/95/31  
E 10708/95/31

(Print.)

61795

(How disposed of.)

25) Mr Stafford Smith  
C.O.  
from Mr Kinnear  
9. Dec  
26) Mr R.C. Mitchell  
H.M.P.  
9. Dec

(Action completed.)

24/12

(Index)

[Signature]

Next Paper.

11012

Make white

(Minutes.)

The H.C. has just made a  
statement explaining the  
proposed sale of reclaimed  
land. This looks like a  
further embarrassment but we  
have not the refer. from  
Co. yet.

~~E.M. Dept.~~ ~~M.E.S.~~ ~~for 20~~  
Action has been taken  
Mr. 16712.  
D.S. Baird  
Nov. 24  
L.E.L. Pyman  
25/11  
[Signature]

Please now see E 11097/4/80 and the letter from  
the Ministry of Fuel and Power ~~attached thereto.~~  
E. 12.82/4/80.

It will be seen that there is no question of a  
new concession. All that the Government of Palestine  
is asked to do is to grant permission (against payment)  
for the Iraq Petroleum Company to use its existing  
pipeline for the conveyance of such oil as it may

30471 F.O.P.

obtain/

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3.

obtain from ~~the~~ Basra, Mosul and Transjordan. ~~it is not~~  
*yet known if there is in fact an oil in commercial quantities in T.J.*

The Transjordan concession is of particular importance politically since if oil were found and an oilfield developed it would provide ~~the~~ economic and financial resources in which the country is at present sadly lacking. I submit therefore that we should urge the Colonial Office to authorise the High Commissioner to grant the wayleave which has been asked for. It will be noted that the High Commissioner regards it as in the best interests of Palestine to do so.

*It is not in T.J.*

*A*

If this view is not accepted or if it is found impossible to move the Colonial Office, then I submit that, we should inform King Abdullah that it is no fault of the company ~~that~~ they have been unable to obtain the transit rights through Palestine and we hope that his relations with them will not be affected by this.

*L.F.L. Pyman*

(L.F.L. Pyman)  
5th December, 1947.

*I agree with A of Mr Pyman's minute.*

*write to CO accordingly*

*BAB Burrows*  
5.12

*Mills*  
6.12.

*I submit draft accordingly*

*J. Able*  
(J.E. CAPER)  
8/12

*Now see C.O. TL 3154 to Jerusalem, in the light of which I have amended the draft.*

*L.F.L. Pyman*  
9/12

*Now see E 11981/98 9/31*  
*W.C./12*

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6

Distributed to:-

R.243  
Secretary of State  
Sir T. Lloyd  
Mr. Rees Williams  
Sir S. Caine  
Sir C. Jeffries  
Mr. Holding  
Mr. Martin  
Mr. Trafford Smith  
Mr. Guteh  
Mr. Mathieson  
Mr. Higham  
Mr. Galsworthy  
Mr. Holmer  
Mr. Burt  
Mr. Eastwood  
Mr. Monson  
Ministry of Fuel and Power  
Foreign Office

- Mr. K.N. Stock.  
- Mr. Pyman.

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Registry No.  
E 11011/46/G.

*Secret*

*S/S*  
Draft.

*(E. 11097)*

Mr. Trafford-Smith  
Colonial Office.

from

Mr. Burrows.


*(E. 11097)*

Copy to:

Mr. R.C. Mitchell  
Ministry of Fuel  
and Power.

~~Mr. Burrows~~  
~~Mr. Mitchell~~  
~~Mr. Pyman~~

*L. L. Pyman*  
*9/12*



7  
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

9<sup>th</sup> December, 1947.

*+ 1 copy*  
**FILE**

The High Commissioner's telegram No. 2232 about the Iraqi Petroleum Company's application for leave to use their existing pipeline through Palestine for the conveyance of oil from Basra, Mosul and Transjordan has been considered here in conjunction with Martin's telegram from New York No. 3508 and Mitchell's letter to Burt of the 1st December.

It appears from this correspondence that there is in fact no question <sup>*of a new*</sup> concession. All that the Palestine Government are asked to do is to grant permission (against payment) for the Iraq Petroleum Company to use its existing pipeline for the conveyance of oil from any oilfields it may establish at Basra, Mosul or Transjordan. I do not think that we ~~could~~ be the object of *legitimate* criticism for authorising this, the more so as the High Commissioner considers that it would be in the best interests of Palestine to grant this wayleave.

There is a further point which is of particular importance to the Foreign Office. Transjordan is at present sadly lacking in economic and financial resources. If oil were discovered there in commercial quantities and an oil-field established this would be a great benefit to the country. The Iraq Petroleum Company's concession appears to depend at present to some extent on the ground of wayleave facilities through Palestine, and we should be most unwilling for

/obstacle

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

3148 Wt. 26469/137 50m 9/46 (51) F.&S.

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**FO 371 / 61795**

8

obstacles in the shape of <sup>the</sup> withholding of <sup>transit</sup> ~~wayleave~~ facilities <sup>through Palestine</sup> to be placed in the way of the development of this concession.

In these circumstances ~~and now that the United Nations discussions on Palestine have ended~~ we feel that the High Commissioner should be authorised to grant the wayleave requested by the Company.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mitchell at the Ministry of Fuel and Power.

*Since the above letter was drafted I have seen your telegram N: 3154 (which was sent without our concurrence) to Jerusalem. I trust that in view of the considerations set out above you will be prepared to reconsider the question.*

*JARRS*  
9.12

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9

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

9th December, 1947.

(E 11011/46/G)

SECRET

The High Commissioner's telegram No. 2232 about the Iraqi Petroleum Company's application for leave to use their existing pipeline through Palestine for the conveyance of oil from Basra, Mosul and Transjordan has been considered here in conjunction with Martin's telegram from New York No. 3508 and Mitchell's letter to Burt of the 1st December.

It appears from this correspondence that there is in fact no question of a new concession. All that the Palestine Government are asked to do is to grant permission (against payment) for the Iraq Petroleum Company to use its existing pipeline for the conveyance of oil from any oilfields it may establish at Basra, Mosul or Transjordan. I do not think that we could be the object of legitimate criticism for authorising this, the more so as the High Commissioner considers that it would be in the best interests of Palestine to grant this wayleave.

There is a further point which is of particular importance to the Foreign Office. Transjordan is at present sadly lacking in economic and financial resources. If oil were discovered there in commercial quantities and an oil-field established this would be a great benefit to the country. The Iraq Petroleum Company's concession appears to depend at present to some extent on the ground of wayleave facilities through Palestine, and we should be most unwilling for obstacles in the shape of the withholding of transit facilities through Palestine to be placed in the way of the development of this concession.

Trafford Smith, Esq.,  
Colonial Office.

/ In

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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
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Reference:-

**FO 371/61795**

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10

In these circumstances we feel that the High Commission should be authorised to grant the wayleave requested by the Company.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mitchell at the Ministry of Fuel and Power.

Since the above letter was drafted I have seen your telegram No. 3154 to Jerusalem which was sent without our concurrence. I trust that in view of the considerations set out above you will be prepared to reconsider the question.

(B.A.B. Burrows)

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**FO 371/61795**

14  
A/AE/34

11

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not legal for present gov of Palestine  
to grant in except cases in view  
of ~~para~~ Chp III AA 3(d) of Ad  
of ~~the~~ Alan ~~Smith~~ ... S/C I report  
is to be in schools as a way leave through  
because we can't guarantee Pl.  
by 15 May.

Does it hold anything up

if not, then is case  
~~para~~

to be proceeding

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 1 |   |   |   | 2 |   |

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FO 371/61795

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| 1947 | Palistine | E11016 /G<br>24 NOV 1947 |
|      | EASTERN   |                          |

E11016 146/9  
 Col Waterfield  
 Capt  
 Mr. Burtow  
 COS 139.121117  
 dated 21 Nov  
 Received 24 Nov.

Plans for withdrawal from  
Palistine

|                             |                |
|-----------------------------|----------------|
| Last Paper<br>E11015.       |                |
| References                  |                |
| (Print)                     |                |
| (How disposed of)           |                |
| (Action completed)<br>24/12 | (Index)<br>WJH |
| Next Paper                  |                |

(Minutes)

It seems from paras. 2 and 3 that the M. of Defence are still not quite clear about our position in regard to the termination of the Mandate. We are not primarily interested in "pure legality" but are concerned to avoid a situation in which a U.N. Commission with powers might attempt to duplicate the responsibility of the Mandatory for administration. Therefore we assume that, when the arrival of a U.N. Commission can no longer be delayed, we should have to terminate an overall responsibility

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B  
responsibility i.e. the Mandate,  
this need not prevent the  
Military from using the  
remains of the civil administration  
in the areas where they remain.

S. L. Dept. <sup>EH 1-12</sup>

J. S. Quint  
Nov. 26  
(BEITH)

This has all been caught up in  
the Defence Committee paper to be taken  
to-morrow.

~~26.3~~  
26.4

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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
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15

They would urge therefore that the policy for the withdrawal should be based principally on the requirement for conducting this extremely difficult operation in the way least likely to produce overwhelming difficulties for those who have to carry it out and not on the pure legality of the date of surrender of the Mandate and arrival of the U.N.O. Commission.

3 If the arrival of the U.N.O. Commission cannot be delayed until the final stages of our evacuation are about to be completed, we can see no reasonable alternative to a step by step withdrawal of civil administration and military forces and a simultaneous assumption of authority by the U.N.O. Commission in the areas from which we have withdrawn.

4 The Chiefs of Staff emphasise that the G.O.C. must be given full and sufficient authority by H.M.G. to take whatever action is necessary to ensure the safety and maintenance of the troops under his command. This may entail taking offensive action in areas under the control of the United Nations Commission.

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729

E

11049

1947

PALESTINE

25 NOV

17

Registry Number

E11049/46/31

FROM

General Sir John Shea

No.

G.

Dated

to Mr. Beins

Received in Registry

19 Nov

25

Palestine Situation

Asks if it not possible to prevent partition of the Holy Land which will cause the same hideous state of affairs as in India and Pakistan, and will alienate the whole of the Arab World.

Last Paper

11016

(Minutes.)

Draft submitted

References

Mr. Beins  
Nov. 27

(Print)

JAB

(How disposed of)

apt. General Sir John Shea from Sept.

7.11

In P.P. Gen Sir J. Shea 10/12

✓  
Dec. 3

H3. 15/12

(Action completed)

G.L. 4/12

(Index)

[Signature] 4/12

Next Paper

11054

39538

|   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |

Reference: FO 371/61795

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Registry  
No. E 11049

B. A. B. B.

*Draft.*

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Open.

General Sir John  
Shea.

(From the Secretary  
of State)

RECEIVED IN  
DIVISION.

2 - DEC 1947

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| SENT TO<br>TYPE | 2/12 |
| DISPATCHED      | 4/12 |

OUT FILE  
*FOC*

*20*  
*2pm*  
~~November,~~ 1947.  
*3 Dec*

*Dear Sir John,*

Thank you for your letter of November  
19th about Palestine.

We referred the Palestine question  
to the United Nations when it became  
clear that there was no possibility of  
continuing to carry out the mandate.  
During the United Nations debates we have  
consistently adopted an attitude of  
impartiality, not wishing to be associated  
with any particular proposal for a  
settlement or to influence delegations  
of other Powers. We have confined ourselves  
to making it clear that we will not  
ourselves take responsibility for imple-  
menting a settlement which would require  
the use of force against either party in  
Palestine.

I can assure you that we have all  
along been guided by the wish to achieve a  
fair and lasting settlement for the  
welfare of all the inhabitants of Palestine.

*(Sgd.) Ernest Bevin, Yours sincerely*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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FO 371 / 61795

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FROM GENERAL SIR JOHN SHEA  
G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.  
COMMISSIONER FOR LONDON  
KENSINGTON 1137/8

BOY SCOUTS LONDON OFFICE  
3, CROMWELL PLACE  
LONDON, S.W.7

*Put with*

22

10 Dec. 1947

11049 46 31

Dear Mr. Pevin,  
Palatium

I am deeply grateful for  
your letter of 3<sup>rd</sup> Dec<sup>r</sup>.  
I think it is a very remarkable  
thing that anyone so  
deeply engrossed in great  
matters, as you are at  
present, (and incidentally  
I imagine had put to it to

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FO 371 / 61795

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23.

RECEIVED IN C. B.

12 JUL 1947

Keep your temper, I should  
have taken the time &  
trouble to send me such  
a comprehensive answer.  
Hence my sincere gratitude

*J. H. H. H.*  
J. H. H. H.

The Rt Hon. Ernest Bevin M.P.  
Foreign Secretary  
Foreign Office  
Whitehall S.W.1.

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FO 371 / 61795

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740

E

11054

2H

1947

PALESTINE

25 NOV

Registry Number

E11054/46/31

FROM

R. G. Jones

No.

48 ponds

Dated

Printed

Received in Registry

20 Nov 25 -

Training of Arabs.

An ex-officer returned from Palestine is reported that shortly the Arabs will be governing themselves and owing to lack of trained army and Police personnel they will have great difficulty besides returning to Palestine for purpose of training same asks particulars.

Last Paper

11049

(Minutes.)

Arabs reply agreed with

References

CO. J

JBMM.29

(Print)

(How disposed of)

alt R.G. Jones  
Dec 3

80. (Ref)  
Dec. 3

(Action completed)

✓ C/W 3/12

(Index)

✓ 2/17/48

Next Paper

11057

38538

|   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

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Reference: **FO 371/61795**

IC please E 25  
Mr. R. G. Jones,  
8, Willow Grove,  
Hillfields Park,  
Fishponds, Bristol.

20th November, 1947. 11054

Dear Sir,

25 NOV

I am an ex-Officer who has recently returned from Palestine. During my stay there I became interested in the Arab world, I am now very perturbed when I realise that very shortly they will be governing themselves. I know that they have no trained Army or Police Forces, and I also know that no state can be governed without trained police, or army personnel, particularly in the case of an Arab State.

I, and one or two other Officers have been seriously considering returning to Palestine and giving the Arabs a hand with the training of Police and Army forces. I am not sure if this course is legal, I am also sure that there are other difficulties to overcome.

I should be very grateful if you could advise me of the legality of my proposed future actions as mentioned above, and any other difficulties which are likely to arise in connection with these plans. I should also appreciate it if you could advise me as to the Arab organisation to approach in regard to the above.

I am Sir,  
Your sincere Servant.

R.G.Jones  
R.G.Jones.

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(13555) W.L. 43698-114 200m 2/47 G.S.S. Gp. 620

Registry  
No. 11054/46/31

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|-------------------------|
| <del>Top Secret</del>   |
| <del>Secret</del>       |
| <del>Confidential</del> |
| <del>Restricted</del>   |
| Open.                   |

JGSB.

*Draft.*

To:  
R.G. Jones, Esq.,  
8 Willow Grove,  
Hillfields Park,  
Fishponds, Bristol.

*Copy comes  
to Co.*

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| RECEIVED IN<br>DIVISION. |      |
| 1-DEC 1947               |      |
| SENT TO<br>TYPE          | 1/12 |
| DESPATCHED               |      |

**OUT FILE**

*Jan 26  
3 a.m.*  
29th November, 1947.  
*3 Dec*

Sir,

I am directed etc. to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 20th, enquiring whether it would be possible for you to return to Palestine and help with the training of Arab Police and armed forces.

2. If you wish to enter Palestine during the present period before the British Mandate is terminated you should apply to the Passport Office, who will refer your application to the Government of Palestine. As regards the desirability of your taking up the service mentioned by you, I am to suggest that when applying for a visa to enter Palestine you should at the same time call at the Colonial Office and consult that Department.

*JB Mr. 29*

*I am,*

*(Sgd.) B.A.B. Burrows.*

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Reference:-

**FO 371/61795**

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E 11054/46/31

OUT FILE

27

S.W. 1.

3rd December, 1947

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Bevin to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 20th November, enquiring whether it would be possible for you to return to Palestine and help with the training of Arab Police and armed forces.

2. If you wish to enter Palestine during the present period before the British Mandate is terminated you should apply to the Passport Office, who will refer your application to the Government of Palestine. As regards the desirability of your taking up the service mentioned by you, I am to suggest that when applying for a visa to enter Palestine you should at the same time call at the Colonial Office and consult that Department.

I am,  
Sir,  
Your obedient servant,

(Sqd.) B.A.B. Burrows.

R.G. Jones, Esq.,  
8, Willow Grove,  
Hillfields Park,  
Fishponds,  
Bristol.

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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|   |   | 1 |   | 2 |   |

Reference:-

FO 371/61795

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741

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28

E 11057

1947

PALESTINE

25 NOV

Registry Number

E11057/46/31

FROM

P.Q

No.

M. K. Dixon

Dated

19/11/47

Received in Registry

25 ~

*Palatine, Evacuation.*

*M. K. Dixon writes in view of murder of soldiers and  
kivellon - Palatine and arrangements to be made  
to complete evacuation of British Poles not later  
than 1st May unless of 1. Aug.  
M. K. Dixon says, replied that it would not  
be done before 1. Aug.*

Last Paper

11054

(Minutes.)

*M. K. Dixon  
Nov. 25*

References

*P. Q. B.*

*26-11*

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

*P. Q. B. 27/11*

(Index)

*[Signature]*  
*27/11*

Next Paper

E11069

33538

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| 1 |  |
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| 3 |  |
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FO 371 / 61795

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EASTERN

E 29  
11057  
Parliamentary Question

\* 19. Mr. Lipson.—To ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies, if, in view of the further murders of British soldiers and civilians in Palestine, he will arrange for the evacuation of British personnel from Palestine to be completed not later than 1st May instead of 1st August, as had been announced. [Wednesday 19th November.]

Ind

Cheltenham

ANSWERED 19 NOV 1947  
REPLY ATTACHED.

F.O. ARE NOT ASKED TO ADVISE.

Attach reply  
to Nov. 18

1123/4.

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Reference:- **FO** 371 / 61795



30

**British Personnel  
(Withdrawal)**

34. **Mr. Lipson** asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if, in view of the further murders of British soldiers and civilians in Palestine, he will arrange for the evacuation of British personnel from Palestine to be completed not later than 1st May instead of 1st August, as had been announced.

**Mr. Creech Jones:** His Majesty's Government deeply deplore the continuing toll of British lives in Palestine, but they consider that 1st August is the earliest date by which the withdrawal of all British troops in Palestine could be completed, having regard particularly, to their number, the large quantities of equipment involved and the problem of transport.

**Mr. Lipson:** Is the Secretary of State aware of the concern felt by relatives of these men in this country at the long time that it is proposed to take for evacuation, and can he give an assurance that all possible speed will be shown in bringing about the evacuation, and, in particular, that there is no intention to go slow with evacuation until April, in order to make possible the export of the citrus crop from Palestine?

**Mr. Creech Jones:** All steps will be taken to secure as speedy a withdrawal, as possible, but it is a very complicated operation, and problems of accommodation and transport must be considered if the thing is to be carried through effi-

ciently and at all effectively.

**Mr. Stokes:** Will my right hon. Friend make clear to our American friends that unless they stop subsidising the Zionist movement, the Western mammals will soon have to send their sons to Palestine to impose an unwelcome policy?

**Dr. Segal:** Could my right hon. Friend give an undertaking to make at least an early withdrawal of British Forces into the Gaza area where there is ample accommodation for all the troops at present in Palestine? Can he give a further undertaking that in the evacuation not only the ports of Haifa and Jaffa will be used, but that the widest possible use will be made of road and rail facilities to the Suez Canal zone?

**Mr. Creech Jones:** The withdrawal from Palestine cannot be discussed by question and answer on the Floor of the House.

**Mr. Pickthorn:** Could the right hon. Gentleman say whether his original answer was meant to imply that all equipment will be got out by 1st August?

**Mr. Creech Jones:** We hope that as much equipment as possible will be withdrawn by that date.

**Mr. Thurtle:** Can my right hon. Friend say whether the withdrawal has already started?

**Mr. Creech Jones:** All I can say is that the matter is receiving our most active consideration.

19 NOV 1947

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|  |          | Palestine   |  | E11069 / G |  |
|  |          | EASTERN   |  |            |  |
| 149 31<br>E11069 / 46 / C<br>New York<br>3519<br>Dated 24 Nov<br>Received 25 Nov |          | U.S. attitude to Palestine<br>question: Statement by<br>Mr Herschel Johnson   |  |            |  |
| Last Paper.<br>E11016  |          | (Minutes.)  |  |            |  |
| References.<br>E11032 / 95 / 31.   |          | Please see also E11070 / 4.<br>It would seem very desirable<br>for the S. of S. to speak to<br>Mr Marshall as suggested. It<br>will not now <sup>decisively</sup> affect the<br>attitude of the U.S. Delegation,<br>as the vote in the General<br>Assembly is due to come up<br>tomorrow or shortly after.<br>Perhaps Sir A. Cadogan<br>should also be instructed to<br>address a last and solemn<br>warning to the Assembly. |  |            |  |
| (Print.)   |          |   |  |            |  |
| (How disposed of.)   |          |   |  |            |  |
| Ted Wilson 12222<br>Rpd New York<br>26 Nov<br>4110                               |          |   |  |            |  |
| (Action completed.)  | (Index.) |   |  |            |  |
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| Next Paper.  |          |   |  |            |  |

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Searched by Mr Burrows.  
 S. J. S.

D. S. Beins  
 Nov. 25  
 (BEIT 1)

33

S. d. S. has seen this fd. and  
agreed to act on the suggestion

J. B. M. V. 25

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**FO 371/61795**

34 E/G

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Cypher/OTP.

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET).

E11069

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3519. D. 12.26 p.m. 24th November 1947.

24th November 1947. R. 5.47 p.m. 24th November 1947.

Repeated to: Jerusalem and  
Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

LIGHT.

My telegram No. 3512.

Following for Secretary of State from Minister of State.

You will have seen that Herschel Johnson, in his last speech in the Palestine Committee:

(A) Accused His Majesty's Government of having adopted an unhelpful attitude, and of having done nothing to bridge the gap relating to enforcement in the partition plan;

(B) Stated that the United States Delegation would not understand abstentions when the vote was taken.

2. There are signs that the American attempt to stampede the Assembly, both by pressure and by constant suggestion that when the time comes His Majesty's Government will not be able to avoid active co-operation with the United Nations Commission, is meeting with some success. The reversal of the Chinese position is a case in point.

3. In these circumstances you may wish to speak to Marshall, warning him of the risk that the General Assembly is being called upon to take by voting for partition without providing any means of enforcing it, and of the heavy responsibility which the United States Government will bear if its tactics succeed in persuading Delegations against their own judgment to assume this risk.

Please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 252.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office, for re-transmission to Jerusalem.]

[Copy sent to Private Secretary.]

W:W:W:W:W

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FO 371/61795

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Registry  
No. E11069/46/G

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# CYPHER

6 11 1947 35

Draft.  
WASHINGTON

Immediate Despatched 9 50 P.M.  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET

Telegram.  
No. 12222  
(Date) Nov. 26.

Addressed to Washington Delegation  
telegram No. 12222 of Nov 26<sup>th</sup>, repeated for information to U.K. Delegation New York.

Repeat to:—  
U.K. Delegation  
New York 4110

U.K. Delegation New York telegram  
No. 3519 [of Nov. 24 : Palestine].

Private Sec. PD, 26/11  
B.S. Benin Nov. 26  
B.B. Bunnor 26.11  
En-Clair. 26.11  
Code. M. Wright  
Cypher. 26.11

I discussed the Palestine question with Mr Marshall on November 24th. I drew attention to the statements by Mr Herschel Johnson at the United Nations Assembly reported in New York telegram ~~No. 3519~~ under refce. to the effect that H.M.G. had adopted an unhelpful attitude and done nothing to breach the gap relating to enforcement in the partition plan; and that the U.S. delegation would not understand abstention when the vote was taken. I added that there were indications of an American attempt to stampede the Assembly both by pressure and by constant suggestion that when the time came H.M.G. would not be able to avoid active cooperation with the U.N. Commission.

Distribution:—  
Cabinet

2. I then outlined briefly recent developments in connection with Palestine and explained the grave difficulties with which we had been faced and my disappointment at many turns in American policy. It seemed to me that this great issue had been handled more with the electoral situation in New York City in mind than ~~with~~ having regard to the large issues of foreign policy involved. I wished to warn Mr Marshall that/

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(1956) Wt. 2007-140 100m 8147 G.S.St. Gp 620

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**FO 371 / 61795**

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36

that anti-semitism was growing in this country and that feelings ran high in the House of Commons. This situation had been brought to a head by the callous murder of the two British sergeants. Up to that time I had felt that the situation in Palestine might have been held but since then the position had entirely changed. H.M.G. had decided that they would withdraw from Palestine and, as regards the vote to be cast at the United Nations, I had already given instructions that the U.K. Delegation should abstain. I was distressed at the turn events were taking and thought it deplorable that the United Kingdom was again being held up to ignominious abuse.

3. Mr Marshall said that he fully realised that in many respects the United Kingdom had not been fairly treated over Palestine. He himself had inherited a policy from his predecessors which he had had no part in formulating. He had nevertheless spoken in very strong terms to the Jews and left them in no doubt whatever of his attitude to their present activities. He had also made it clear to the Arabs that he would not give way to any blackmailing tactics on their part. He wished however to take strong exception to the last point I had made. There was no intention on his part of making things more difficult for the U.K. and he disliked that suggestion. What he sought was to reach if possible an orderly settlement.

~~It is a fact that the United Kingdom has been treated unfairly in Palestine.~~  
~~It is a fact that the United Kingdom has been treated unfairly in Palestine.~~  
Palestine was an essential part of the Middle East.

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and unless a ~~satisfactory settlement~~ was reached  
~~there any common policy~~ <sup>satisfactory for the ME</sup> would be much more  
~~difficult to achieve.~~

4. I finally said that I hoped that Mr Marshall would be able to review the situation in the light of the explanations which I had given and that it would be possible for him to restrain Mr ~~Herschell~~ Johnston from increasing our difficulties in the Middle East.

BABCB  
26.11

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E 11069/46/G

Secret.

38

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 12222  
26th November, 1947. D. 9.50 p.m. 26th November, 1947.

Repeated to New York (UKDEL) No. 4110.

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 12222 of November 26th repeated for information to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

United Kingdom Delegation New York telegram No. 3519 [of November 24th: Palestine].

I discussed the Palestine question with Mr. Marshall on November 24th. I drew attention to the statements by Mr. Herschel Johnson at the United Nations Assembly reported in New York telegram under reference to the effect that His Majesty's Government had adopted an unhelpful attitude and done nothing to breach the gap relating to enforcement in the partition plan; and that the United States delegation would not understand abstention when the vote was taken. I added that there were indications of an American attempt to stampede the Assembly both by pressure and by constant suggestion that when the time came His Majesty's Government would not be able to avoid active co-operation with the United Nations Commission.

2. I then outlined briefly recent developments in connexion with Palestine and explained the grave difficulties with which we had been faced and my disappointment at many turns in American policy. It seemed to me that this great issue had been handled more with the electoral situation in New York City in mind than having regard to the large issues of foreign policy involved. I wished to warn Mr. Marshall that anti-semitism was growing in this country and that feelings ran high in the House of Commons. This situation had been brought to a head by the callous murder of the two British sergeants. Up to that time I had felt that the situation in Palestine might have been held but since then the position had entirely changed. His Majesty's Government had decided that they would withdraw from Palestine and as regards the vote to be cast at the United Nations, I had already given instructions that the United Kingdom Delegation should abstain. I was distressed at the turn events were taking and thought it deplorable that the United Kingdom was again being held up to ignominious abuse.

3./...

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3. Mr. Marshall said that he fully realised that in many respects the United Kingdom had not been fairly treated over Palestine. He himself had inherited a policy from his predecessors which he had had no part in formulating. He had nevertheless spoken in very strong terms to the Jews and left them in no doubt whatever of his attitude to their present activities. He had also made it clear to the Arabs that he would not give way to any blackmailing tactics on their part. He wished however to take strong exception to the last point I had made. There was no intention on his part of making things more difficult for the United Kingdom and he disliked that suggestion. What he sought was to reach if possible an orderly settlement. Palestine was an essential part of the Middle East.

4. I finally said that I hoped that Mr. Marshall would be able to review the situation in the light of the explanations which I had given and that it would be possible for him to restrain Mr. Herschel Johnson from increasing our difficulties in the Middle East.

QQQ

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En clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3512. B. 7.42 p.m. 23rd November, 1947.  
23rd November, 1947. R. 7.40 a.m. 24th November, 1947.  
Repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

GLANT.

My telegram No. 3510.

Palestine Committee.

At the third meeting on the 22nd November the first speaker was the delegate for Chile who announced that he would vote for the partition proposal. He was followed by Alireza (Saudi Arabia) who said he was not prepared to discuss the partition plan. He wished however to emphasise that the committee were being asked to approve the establishment under United Nations auspices of a Jewish Army. Referring to a remark made in Sub-Committee 1 by Granados, he said that one of "your nominated commissioners" had already stated that he would rather have 5,000 men than 30,000 children as immigrants for reasons which were obvious. Alireza also commented on Pruszyński's statement that the Bedouin had not been included in Sub-Committee's figures of population because they were nomads. Were nomads not human beings?

2. Pearson (Canada) said that the amended proposal for implementation placed more emphasis than the original draft had done on co-operation between United Nations and the mandatory power. The fact that they did not know on what date the mandate would be terminated was a very real difficulty. But they must assume from what the United Kingdom Delegation had said that the mandate would be terminated very soon. This seemed to imply that it would terminate before the British forces were withdrawn from any area. If this were in fact the intention most of the inconsistencies in the plan for implementation would disappear. But if by some chance areas were evacuated before the mandate ended, how could the mandatory maintain its responsibilities in those areas? It was true that not all the difficulties of implementation had been overcome, but "all we can do is to hope that the peoples of Palestine will co-operate". Pearson challenged Berendsen to produce an amendment on the lines of his speech. Referring to Johnson's [? omission] the United Kingdom's attitude he said that the Sub-Committee had received every possible assistance from the United Kingdom Delegation. He proceeded however to exclude the United Kingdom Government from this compliment. The plan of Sub-Committee 1 would work provided that it obtained the co-operation of the mandatory power, the active backing of the permanent members of the Security Council and acceptance by the peoples of Palestine and by all members of the United Nations. So far as the mandatory power was concerned, he was confident that the Commission could count on its co-operation.

3. Nincic (Yugoslavia) stated that his delegation had /not...

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| <p>180</p> <p>E 11070/46/C</p> <p>W'ion<br/>6631</p> <p>Dated 24 Nov<br/>Received 25 Nov.</p> | <p>Palestine</p> <p>EASTERN</p>                          | <p>112</p> <p>E 11070 /G</p> |
| <p>Last Paper.</p> <p>E 11069</p>   | <p>U.S. statements regarding Palestine</p>               |                              |
| <p>References.</p> <p>E 11069/46/C</p>  | <p>(Minutes.)</p> <p>See E 11069</p>                     |                              |
| <p>(Print.)</p>   | <p>J. J. Beir<br/>Nov. 25<br/>(BEITH)<br/>JB Nov. 25</p> |                              |
| <p>(How disposed of.)</p>   |  |                              |
| <p>(Action completed.)</p> <p>25/26/4</p>   | <p>(Index.)</p> <p>WGH.</p>                              |                              |
| <p>Next Paper.</p>  |  |                              |

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43

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Cypher/OTP.

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Inverchapel.  
No. 6651.

D. 8.25 p.m. 24th November, 1947.

R. 1.30 a.m. 25th November, 1947.

24th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem,  
New York (U.K. Delegation)

IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

LIGHT.

United Kingdom Delegation New York telegram No. 5519  
to you: Palestine.

Henderson spontaneously referred to Johnson's statement during conversation with Allen today and said that it had been made without consultation with State Department. He deplored these unfortunate and untimely remarks, which he had taken up at a high level, pointing out very strongly the dangers to be feared from such an attitude.

2. He said that Herschel Johnson was being instructed not (repeat not) to make further statements of this kind and not (repeat not) to influence votes of other delegations in any way.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 102.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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*E11072*

*E11073*

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\*delete as necessary

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1947

PALESTINE

E 11088

26 NOV

Registry Number

E11088/46/31

FROM

Dudley A.

No.

Bristow

Dated

Ontario

Received in Registry

Canada.

11/10/47

26 -

Palestine, British Policy.

would like to be in a position to write an informed article covering British policy in Palestine to contradict a series of derogatory articles in connection with British Policy.

Ask for clarification of points mentioned, listing of main developments together with some references.

Last Paper

11073

(Minutes.)

Imv JB Dec. 22

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

OK - Dudley A. Bristow

✓ Nov. 26

(Action completed)

✓ 11/30/47

(Index)

✓ 8/9/48

Next Paper

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45 E

Box 164, Woodbridge,  
Ontario, Canada,  
November 11, 1947.

11088

26 NOV

The British Foreign Office,  
British Government,  
London, England.

Dear Sirs:

I would like to be in a position to write an informed article covering British policy in Palestine. The purpose is to contradict a series of derogatory statements in connection with British policy. These statements have appeared in a university publication with which I have a connection. They flow from Communist sources but are fairly well disguised.

My knowledge of the historical background of the present crisis in Palestine is very much disconnected and is particularly vague about the significance of White Papers. I fully appreciate the fact that Britain has been bearing the whole responsibility for maintaining order in Palestine and that her most vehement critics have been none too anxious to share that responsibility. From what I have read I obtain the impression that the U.S.S.R. has issued conflicting statements from time to time in order not to antagonize the Arabs while retaining the goodwill of the Jews. The position of the United States appears to have been regulated by domestic political considerations. I am puzzled also by what interpretation to place upon the fact that many of the Jews fleeing Europe come from Russia or her satellites. If racial discrimination is frowned upon in Soviet countries, why are the Jews not all made welcome in Eastern Europe where the decrease in the population during the war has been very heavy.

Some clarification of the above, a listing of the main developments together with a few references would be greatly appreciated.

Yours very truly,

*Dudley A. Bristow*

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No. E 11088/46/31.

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JGSB.

*oe*  
Draft letter.

Mr. Dudley A.  
Bristow,  
Box 164,  
Woodbridge.  
Ontario,  
CANADA.

RECEIVED IN  
DIVISION  
22 DEC 1947  
SENT TO TYPE 23/12  
REMARKS 26/12

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(2/47) (14728) Wt. 11489-144 250m 5/47 G.S.St.

10C  
OUT FILE

23pm  
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,

26 December, 1947. *Ab*

Sir,

I am directed etc. to acknowledge receipt of your letter of November 11th asking for information about the historical background of the present situation in Palestine.

2. I am to suggest that the most suitable work of reference for the purposes of your intended article would be the "Political History of Palestine under British Administration" submitted to the United Nations by His Majesty's Government. This was printed by the British Information Service, New York, who would be glad to supply you with a copy if you will apply to them.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

*JB Dec. 22*

(sd) B.A.B. Burrows

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E 11088/46/31.

FOREIGN OFFICE,  
S.W.1.

26th December, 1947.

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Bevin to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 11th November asking for information about the historical background of the present situation in Palestine.

2. I am to suggest that the most suitable work of reference for the purposes of your intended article would be the "Political History of Palestine under British Administration" submitted to the United Nations by His Majesty's Government. This was printed by the British Information Service, New York, who would be glad to supply you with a copy if you will apply to them.

I am,  
Sir,  
Your obedient servant,

*Sd/ A. B. Burrows*

D.A. Bristow, Esq.,  
Box 164,  
Woodbridge,  
Ontario,  
Canada.

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1947

PALESTINE

48

Registry Number E11089/46/31.  
 FROM O'Leary  
 No. Washington  
 Dated 12/30/47  
 Received in Registry 18 Nov 28

*Palatine U.S. Attitude*  
 Congresswoman Frances Potts, just returned from tour of M.E. told House of Foreign Affairs Committee that the US stand favour of the partition of Palestine had created general dissatisfaction in the M.E. General opinion is that Jewish Agency had accepted partition plan only for the time being. She said it was the responsibility of the US to take note of the Arab attitude which showed little reliance on the US.

Last Paper

11088

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

8. ~~Wacker~~ to  
 Mar. 27

(Action completed)

J. C. H. 2/12

(Index)

ALL  
 8/4/48

Next Paper

11092

(Minutes.)

Copy Co. (Mr. Mathieson)

N.A. Dept. <sup>Chas.</sup> 1/12

J.B.M. 26

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

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 Reference: FO 371/61795

11089

28 NOV

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

18th November 1947

Ref: 15/353/47

Dear Department,

According to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Congresswoman Frances Bolton, who has recently returned from a tour of the Middle East, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on November 14th that the United States stand in favour of the partition of Palestine had created general dissatisfaction in the Middle East. She said that though the Jewish Agency had accepted the partition plan, it seemed to be generally understood that they did so only for the time being. She considered that it was the responsibility of the United States to take note of the Arab attitude which she asserted had received little publicity in this country. She felt that the Mufti was growing in popularity and power, and xenophobia was very much on the increase in all the countries in the Near and Middle East. This was undoubtedly subtly fostered by the Kremlin but it was led openly in the Near East by the Mufti.

We are sending a copy of this letter to Jerusalem.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

*fa*

Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61795

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1947

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PALESTINE

50

11092

25 NOV

Registry Number E11092/46/31  
 FROM Ray. C.  
 No. Thomson  
 Dated 11/11/47  
 Received in Registry 21 Nov  
 26 -

*Palatine Solution.*  
 Suggest: Criteria to offered to the Palatine  
 Arabs for the complete abandonment of their claims  
 to Palestine some small part of it, provided  
 to them because of religious and sentimental  
 interest

Last Paper

11089

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

*Act.*  
*Nov - 28*

(Action completed)

*J. E. M. 29/11*

(Index)

*[Signature]*

Next Paper

11094

(Minutes.)

*Acting*


*20 Nov. 26*

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Chertown East Lane - East Horsley <sup>51</sup>  
Surrey  
21/11/47 E

The Right Hon. Ernest Bevin  
The Foreign Office  
Whitehall. London



Sir

I have the honour to suggest  
a possible solution of the Holy Land  
problem, that Britain be offered to the  
Palestinian Arabs for the complete  
abandonment of their claim to the first  
above mentioned region, save except  
that small part of it, precious to them,  
because of religious & sentimental  
interest.

By such an arrangement it  
might be possible for both these  
countries to be shepherded into the  
fold of the British Commonwealth;  
as distinct dominions

As an inducement, special facilities  
could be provided for the Arab trans-  
-migration, together with grants-in-aid  
and trade preferences.

Doubtless the chief objector  
would be Italy, but surely by her

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Reference:-

FO 371/61795

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52

peculiar attitude and conquest she has  
forfeited her rights to her former  
colony.

Apologising in advance for this  
presumption

I have the honour to be, Sir  
Your obedient servant  
Roy. G. Thomson.

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**FO 371/61795**



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1947

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E 11094 53

26 NOV

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 11094/46/31

FROM

My 4ul x

No.

Power

Dated

board

Received in Registry

21.11.47

26 -

British casualties in Palestine.  
Copy of letter from H. Gailshull to Sir. G.  
Geddes, conveying deepest sympathy & dependence  
of 3 members of our company staff who lost  
their lives in recent outrage in Palestine.

Last Paper

11092

(Minutes.)

References

J. S. Beins  
Nov. 26

Ec. Relations 2/1/48

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(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

J. E. M. 3/12

(Index)

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Next Paper

E 11158

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Reference:-

FO 371/61795

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*With the Private Secretary's  
Compliments*

211094  
26 NOV

MINISTRY OF FUEL AND POWER

21st. November, 1947.

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61795

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55

21<sup>st</sup> November, 1947.

Dear Sir Frederick,

I am exceedingly distressed to hear that three members of your staff have lost their lives in Palestine and I should be grateful if you would convey to their dependents my deepest sympathy in the grievous blow that has befallen them.

The manner in which the employees of the oil companies are carrying out their important duties in the Middle East in these difficult times has impressed me greatly and the loss of men like Unwin, Carter and Attwood is, indeed, a tragedy.

*Yours sincerely,*

(Sgd.) Hugh Gaitskell.

Sir Frederick Godber,  
St. Helen's Court,  
Great St. Helen's,  
E.C.3.

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61795

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71

1947

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E 11158

27 NOV

56

PALESTINE

Registry Number } E 11158/46/31  
 FROM Private Sec  
 to Chambers  
 of Exchequer  
 No.  
 Dated  
 Received in Registry } 24 Nov  
 27 -

Solution to Palestine Problem  
 Transmits copy of letter from D.P.L. Chamberlain  
 to P.L. House, enclosing proposed solution  
 to the Palestine Problem.

Last Paper

11094

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

D.P.L. Chambers  
 Sec 3

(Action completed)

*[Signature]*

(Index)

*[Signature]*

Next Paper

E 11170

(Minutes.)

~~draft~~ reply  
 B.M.V. 29

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**FO 371/61795**

7 1 1 5 8

27 NOV

57E

The enclosed letter is forwarded  
for the attention of your  
Department.

The writer has (~~not~~) been informed.

WITH COMPLIMENTS

-of-

Private Secretary to ~~the Minister~~  
~~for Economic Affairs~~

The Chancellor of the Exchequer.

24th November, 1947.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.  
Great George Street,  
London, S.W.1.

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**FO 371 / 61795**



TEL. 25448

21 NOV 1947

Lewis Bruce

19 NOV 1947

8 BUCKINGHAM TERRACE  
EDINBURGH

59

November 17th, 1947.

Dear Sir,

Referring to my letter of November 5th -  
Now that Sir Stafford Cripps is Chancellor of the Exchequer there is even greater reason than before for him to read the enclosed. I could have spun it out but I have chosen to cut it down to what a man accustomed to papers can read well inside a  $\frac{1}{2}$  hour.

The so-called "redistribution of the national income" simply means that politicians have transferred that part of business profits which were annually used in reorganising industry for further development, transferred it to the wage-earner, who, from the nature of things, would not know how to use his income-increase, even if he wished, in doing that essential thing.

The salaried man ~~and manufacturer~~ and manufacturer, who used to invest a bit every year, now, after deducting taxation, have nothing to invest, and usually more expensive responsibilities. The so-called capitalist is in the same boat. There are exceptions in the three classes but not enough of them to count.

Financing industry, whether nationalised or privately owned, by the State puts up production costs through increased taxation. No dexterity of planning can find a substitute in the country for the previous surplus which used to be on tap for national development.

Therefore the funds for development have to be sought outside the country.

I suppose it is because we have a Socialist Government that everybody, including the Conservative Party, seems to imagine the only way this country can get finance from outside it is by favour of Mr Marshall. By that method we are bound to put our commercial future, and possibly that of the Commonwealth and Colonies, to a very large extent, in pawn to the United States.

The average income of the American citizen is twice what it was before the War. That does not mean only of the wage earner, as it does here, but of everybody else as well. In South America there is a great increase of wealth in the hands of the investment class. The same thing in India. These private funds we should attract for our benefit.

Even if we could raise the money within the country without increasing costs, it is doubtful if we have sufficient

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Reference:-

FO 371/61795

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60

2

man power to increase purely British output to the extent required. Therefore any funds we could raise abroad should be used partly here to increase productivity, and partly in the development of projects abroad, some of the profit of which at any rate should come to this country to help us out. Out of both kinds of development we could repay those who supplied us with the funds.

By using the problem of Palestine in the way I suggest we would turn it to our own advantage, help us to climb out of our own hole.

The larger of my two schemes is not too big for the British Government to handle. For it is a great deal simpler and more straightforward than the American plans for Western Europe. It is designed to help us without being dependent on those plans. But it does not conflict with them, or with us benefiting from them.

The lesser scheme, although it would not bring us direct financial advantage, at any rate states the only peaceable solution of the Palestine problem. By listening to Jew, listening to Arab, listening to Americans, instead of producing a constructive policy of our own, the question is whether we have not already played into Molotov's hands. But if we spoke at once it ought not to be too late even now, because we are still in Palestine, Being still there we could say, if we wished, - we won't go until Jew, Arab, Americans accept our solution for a change.

Both schemes require the consent of the Arabs. Up till now nobody has thought of making any proposal which it would be to the advantage of a single Arab to accept.

If the Government acted on either of my schemes I should have rendered a valuable public service. In the past I, and my father before me, have made proposals to British Governments which have been used. Neither of us ever received public recognition or private thanks or remuneration. It is not however necessary to go into that in this letter further than to say the schemes are my property.

Yours sincerely,

D. P. L. Chalmers.

C. L. Bruce Esq,  
Private Secretary to Sir Stafford Cripps.  
Cabinet Office.  
Great George Street, S.W.I.

*D. P. L. Chalmers*

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61795

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61 19 NOV 1947

The Palestine Problem.

There should be an Agreement between Great Britain, the Arab States, the United States and world Jewry that Palestine shall be a Jewish State under a Jewish Government; that non-Jews shall have the right to reside there for ordinary business purposes, subject to the laws of the country, but under the protection of a Provost of Jerusalem to be appointed under this Agreement.

2. The Arab States to undertake to absorb all Arabs at present resident in Palestine, and to provide them with equivalent lands and/or premises within their territories.

3. The Arabs leaving Palestine to be bought out of their lands at years purchase, and/or to be compensated for their businesses (e.g. as in Jaffa) at years purchase.

4. Arabs who elected to stay would of course receive no payments. But the Provost of Jerusalem would protect them against exploitation or oppression.

5. Palestine to be a neutral country.

6. The frontiers to be jointly and severally guaranteed by a treaty between Great Britain, the Arab States and the United States, against attack, encroachment or infiltration.

7. Palestine to have only a police force good enough to keep order within the country. But to undertake to increase it to the level of a defence force if required to do so by the Arab States, Great Britain and the United States. Such increase only to be allowed if asked for by the Arab League as part of their preparation against aggression. Palestine to enter into no military arrangements with any other country except the Arab States, Great Britain and the United States.

8. In any commercial treaty with another country, or business dealings between Palestinian municipalities or firms and those of another country, the "most favoured nation" principle to apply to the Arab States, Great Britain and the United States.

9. Jerusalem to be set apart from the rest of Palestine as the spiritual home of the Christian, Mahomedan and Jewish faiths, with freedom to all other denominations or sects to have a place of worship there; this would include the Greek and Coptic churches. The boundary of Jerusalem should extend in a circuit of 10 miles so as to include Bethlehem, 5 miles distant, and to allow for growth.

10. The civil administration of Jerusalem to be under a Mayor and City Council; but religious affairs to be managed by their own appropriate bodies. The City Council to be elected by the rate-payers, including the religious bodies, but with the proviso that no priest of any denomination shall be a member.

11. As Great Britain is the Mandatory Power it is our duty when relinquishing the Mandate, to arrange that, as far as possible we leave behind us organised Justice. The Arab States and the United States therefore to agree with Great Britain and any Jewish Provisional Government in Palestine, that the Provost of Jerusalem must always be chosen by vote of the City Council from among the Judges of the High Court of England, or the Court of Session in Scotland or the Supreme Court of the United States, and his appointment be for a minimum period of five years.

12. The Provost to be assisted by a Deputy Provost

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61795

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The Palestine Problem.

62  
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elected in the same way, chosen from the County Court Judges or Sheriffs, or corresponding American Judge, provided the latter is a trained lawyer.

I3. The Provost Court's particular province to be to adjudicate in any disputes between the civil administration and the religious bodies in Jerusalem, or in disputes between one religious body and another, and to act as a court of appeal from a lower Jerusalem court, sitting either with or without a jury as desired by the litigants.

I4. The appointment of Jewish magistrates throughout Palestine to be subject to approval by the Provost and Deputy Provost. The Provost's Court to have power to take a case out of a Magistrates' court. In this way any Arab who opted to remain in Palestine would be protected against possible Jewish discrimination.

I5. After twenty five years this tutelage of Justice to be relinquished, provided Jewish Government of Palestine, the Government of the Arab States, of Great Britain and the United States, are in agreement there are Jews, sufficiently trained in impartiality to take the places of the Provost and Deputy.

I6. The Provost's Court could of course consist of a British, an American, a Jewish and an Arab Judge, if that seemed a more certain way to get impartial Justice than with one Judge. If so a Deputy Provost would not be necessary.

I7. Except in Jerusalem the form of Government for Palestine should be decided by representative Jews from all world Jewry. Native Jews, Moscow-trained "terrorists", the Jewish Agency, American Jews who have worked up enmity to Great Britain, are not the only Jews to be considered in a settlement which is after all just as important to Christianity.

I8. The reason why Palestine should be a Jewish State has been inadvertently pointed out by the Egyptian delegate to U.N.O. He pointed out that under the Covenant there was no provision for the surrender of a Mandate; if it was to be surrendered that could only be to the Turks from whom it had been taken. But nobody proposes to return Palestine to the Turks, who held it for hundreds of years up till Allenby's conquest. The Arabs never held the country at all. But the predecessors of the Turks were the Jews. Therefore the only people who have a moral right to the country are really the descendants of the Jewish tribes who did not leave the country when the Turks conquered it.

In order to bring about this peaceful solution of the Problem of Palestine - the less said about U.N.O's solution under Mr Herschel Johnson's stimulus the better -

The Bank of England to open a Jew and Arab Friendship Loan for 5000,000,000 \$, £1250,000,000, at 5 per cent.

Inviting subscriptions from all over the world, but making a special appeal to world Jewry, Mohammedans and Americans.

Repayment to be at par after ten years, beginning after 10 years, of 2½% of the Capital. That would be £31,250,000 or 125,000,000 \$ each year after ten years; and it would take 50 years to pay off the whole Loan. Repayment could of course be slower or at a lower rate.

Repayment of interest and capital to be guaranteed by the British Government out of profits of trade with the United States.

That means the Americans would have to lower, or remove,

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Reference:-

FO 371/61795

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The Palestine Problem.

63  
3

a definite value in trade value in order to make direct trade with America larger because more profitable, a somewhat different arrangement from that made by them under the late lamented Loan.

It is no use a borrower knowing that his loan can only be repaid by selling to and serving the lender or paying him gold unless the lender agrees to take the right amount in payment. The complicated conditions surrounding the American Loan dodged that inescapable rule. So far as I know the results of the Geneva economic discussions have too.

But as the entire success of Great Britain's export drive depends on our getting behind their supersonic tariff wall we have to make the Americans pierce a suitable hole to let our plane through - forced landings with full loads elsewhere are not enough. It has to be done in a definite way, deliberately done; if not the drive will fail, worse than fail.

My proposed Loan would be the thin end of the wedge into a fair two-way trade with America. And the fact that the down-and-out British actually were going to finance their own way out of their depression without holding out their hands for Mr Marshall's benevolence any more should pretty well cure American myopia. That would be all to the good. For as soon as you let an American understand you do'nt need him he becomes obliging.

The Loan would mean that British profits against it would have to be arranged at some £62,500,000 annually. Assuming trading profit was 5% - a low estimate - the annual value of the trade against the Loan would be £25,000,000.

The purposes of the Loan would be -

I. To make an advance to the Jewish Government to be set up in Palestine to start the new State with cash in the till.

The conditions would be - 5% to be met out of Palestine taxation annually, and the capital sum to be repaid, repayment to begin after ten years (pari passu with British repayment of capital of the Jew and Arab Friendship Loan.)

2. To advance sums in compensation to Arabs who removed themselves from Palestine into Arab States; and to others who removed themselves elsewhere.

3. To make payments to Arab States who found accommodation for Arabs, and others, who came to them out of Palestine.

4. To finance the formation of a Palestine and Arab States Development and Trading Corporation.

The Board would consist of British, Jew and Arab Directors with a working majority of British ones and a British Chairman.

Great Britain would hold 51 per cent of the Stock and Palestine and the Arab States be given the 49 per cent between them.

That Arab State which took the majority of the emigrants from Palestine would get the highest proportion of Stock.

The new Palestine should be content to receive the least of the Stock - having done nothing to earn it.

Palestine and the Arab States in return for an economic settlement instead of war, and in return for shares in the Development Corporation, would agree to the Corporation purchasing all its requirements in Great Britain, and profits from development, such as irrigation works in Mesopotamia for cotton-growing, passing through the hands of the Corporation.

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Reference:-  
**FO 371/61795**

The Palestine Problem.

64  
4

All profits would be allocated to paying off the advances made in connection with setting up the new Palestine, and for receiving and removing Arabs.

After these charges had been paid off profit from the Development Corporation would be divided between the British State, Palestine State and Arab States.

But on the principle that every State should run its own affairs as soon as it can, Palestine and the Arab States should have the right from the first to take over the British share of the Corporation after the Friendship Loan had been redeemed.

After providing for the economic solution of the Palestine-Arab League quarrel the British Government would still have in hand a large amount of the Friendship Loan. I estimate about half of it.

Out of this purchases could be made in America, scheduled as purchases against the particular Loan, of mining equipment to increase coal exports to Europe expediting the Marshall Plan, and other purchases in America, e.g. machine tools, for the same object.

The National Coal Board would pay 5% on the mining equipment to cover the Bondholders' interest required, and any other allocated imports from America the same thing.

Not one penny of the Loan should be spent in consumable goods, e.g. food or tobacco. But the special Loan would put us in a good bargaining position.

For example the Government might be able to purchase the £6000000 of American tobacco manufactured for British consumption, and recently bought by the American Government to hold indefinitely, at a price which would wipe out the ordinary cost of buying dollars. Resale to the British tobacco merchants could be at 5% Government profit which would cover the Bondholders' interest. We would then have in hand enough tobacco for at least three years instead of twenty months. And the highly unpopular tax, alleged to save dollars, could be decreased.

Something similar could be done with petrol. American tanker owners might be glad to sell at a price, rather than lay up indefinitely, which would justify us importing from our own petroleum resources, refining, and reexporting to the Continent. The basic ration could be restored, and the Government would get car and petrol tax. Two real grievances against the Government would be removed, tobacco and petrol. Consumption of both, provided it can be done without dollar purchases, which it could be in this way, are both anti-inflationary.

I will examine some of the points which I can see may be made against my scheme.

Mr Dalton may say if he allowed the British investor to buy any 5% Bonds he would buy the whole Loan, we wouldn't get the dollars we need, and his 2½s would be unsaleable.

But as the Loan would be open to all the world, although we would hope to get most of it from American and Jew investors, the British share of the Loan could be limited to say a quarter of the whole.

Obviously Mr Dalton couldn't give the British investor 2½% and the others 5%. And if he made the whole Loan at 2½% he would get no American investor to look at it. Nor could he exclude the British and get all his subscriptions

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Reference:-  
**FO 371/61795**

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The Palestine Problem.

from abroad. There would be thought to be something fishy and there would be no takers. So he would have to offer the right return to the American and let the British have it too.

Quite probably the British share of the Loan would go to a premium the morning of issue. If it was a trustee stock, and it should be, it would. The speculator has done very well out of cheap money, the trustee certainly has not, to put it mildly. A Loan, which to some extent would set off the losses trustees have to put up with in converting railway stocks, in many cases almost pauperising their beneficiaries, a defenceless class, would be a popular one.

Supposing the Friendship Loan did go even to a 100 per cent premium what of it? As soon as that happened  $2\frac{1}{2}$ s might just as well be bought. Therefore any depreciation in the latter could only be temporary. The American speculator would be quick to see if he bought on this side he would be on a good thing. What would that matter? It would be American money we were getting any way.

So on the whole the Government would get a large amount of dollars to use. The advantage of that would more than compensate any temporary dislocation of cheap money.

Would the American Administration block the Loan? I don't see why they should. It wouldn't conflict with any temporary aid to Europe including ourselves. For it would be a private subscription Loan. It wouldn't hurt the Marshall scheme, for the budget surplus shows America can finance that without raising taxation first. But increased American taxation for the Marshall scheme later on seems to be anticipated. Therefore a private Loan which reduced the necessity for that would be a good thing. A Loan of this kind ought to appeal to the Americans. Part to be spent on peace in Palestine instead of on war; part on financing a Jew government; part in America to increase our coal and other things to the Continent to improve things there; part on Arab States development thus increasing the Bondholders' security. Above all because it would show Great Britain was getting under way with her own steam and not depending on Mr Marshall to be a conjuror or on the American taxpayer.

The Jews obviously would welcome my scheme. In fact it is so favourable to them that I feel I should say I am not a Jew nor have any Jewish connection whatsoever. What I am out after is to suggest a way to stop a war by offering both sides an alternative, financially beneficial to both, one founded on common sense.

The number of Arabs in Palestine is too large to move? There are too many to compensate? Not at all. I don't know if anybody really knows the exact number. I put it at not more than about 750,000, of whom a good many are recent arrivals, come there because the Jews have improved the place. Compensation would be paid to the heads of families and grown males, not to women and children dependents. That should reduce it to about 80,000 persons to be compensated. There are about 70,000 Christians, for whom compensation would be reckoned in the same way. And about 70,000 Beduin. They couldn't be shifted any more than you can clear out Gypsies. But in themselves they are no danger to peace.

The Arab States couldn't absorb the Palestine Arabs? As a matter of fact Iraq could take the lot. Mesopotamia, if irrigation plans were carried out, and the labour there which is not the case, could supply all the cotton Great Britain needs without taking a bale from America. There is a possibility of

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#6.

The Palestine Problem.

course that the Palestine immigrant would'nt do a stroke of work until his money was all gone. That would'nt be our trouble. We would have removed the war risk from Palestine. The Arab might be so fond of his land he would'nt leave Palestine? Some would'nt, and the scheme provides for their protection if they stayed. But one of the troubles I understand is that the Arab sells his land to the Jew and then remains as an uncared for pauper, and the Arab States do'nt like it. Therefore the latter would put on their own kind of pressure to get them to leave.

Would the Arab States accept the scheme? There are sufficient disagreements within the Arab League to make one think they are'nt keen on war. But war has been held out to them as the only alternative. This scheme would save face. It would also be profitable. The Mufti might'nt like it, but then he has to look to the Arab League for support not the League to him.

The problem has been permitted to take the form that it is a matter of Mohammedan honour the world over to keep Palestine as an Arab State as it always was. The Egyptian delegate to U.N.O. inadvertently pointed out that this was not the case. The Ottomans conquered the country centuries ago, and certain Jew tribes, notably those of Judea, remained under their rule. In War I Allenby conquered the country with Arab assistance, but he took it from the Turks, the descendants of the Ottomans. Lawrence, with or without British authority, promised the Arabs Palestine should be an Arab State. As that claim was not pressed before the League of Nations it can be said Lawrence's promise was unauthorised. The Egyptian delegate to U.N.O. pointed out that if Palestine was to be restored to anybody it should be to the Turks - the upper class in Egypt being Turks although he did'nt say that. But the Jews of Judea were there before the Turks and are there after them. Therefore the Jews have a better historical claim than anybody else. This should be emphasised to the Arab States, and it should be pointed out to them that it is more honourable to recognise a clear historical claim which means peace than one which can not be substantiated except by war.

I take it that the attitude of our Government still is -  
1st. Mr Bevin says we will accept any arrangement between Jews and Arabs which adds up to peace in Palestine and then clear out.  
2nd. Mr Creech Jones puts a time limit, after which we clear out whatever happens. U.N.O. can get on with it.

U.N.O.'s scheme, stimulated by Mr Herschel Johnson, is that Great Britain holds the ring while Jews and Arabs get ready for the fight, then Great Britain scuttles out, there's a nice war, and Palestine goes to the winner. U.N.O. can do nothing about it. (I at least am under no delusion, and I do'nt suppose Mr Bevin or Mr Creech Jones is either, that the U.S.A. would'nt raise a finger unless Mr Vyshinsky was caught putting a bomb under Mr Truman's bed.)

We should surely point out to the Americans, Jews and Arabs, and especially to the Arabs, that after the nice war Russia will occupy Palestine. Vyshinsky has made history by actually agreeing twice with Mr Johnson over Palestine. Why? The answer is obvious. Russia will offer to act as U.N.O.'s policeman in keeping the peace in Palestine. Vyshinsky might even offer before the nice war. Offer accepted or not, what happens if Russia acts? It would not be easy for her to enter Palestine by land or sea. But Jugoslavia is near enough for Russian air bases for bombing or airborne troops.

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87. 67

The Palestine Problem.

The Iraqi and Saudi Arabian aviation is no match for the Russian and their armies would be bombed to tatters and towns in Palestine occupied by paratroops. Turkey has so far kept out of the quarrel and seems likely to keep out. The iron curtain would close down over West Asia as well as over East Europe. The pipe lines would be in Russian hands and the Canal controlled. Egypt would be as much in Russia's sphere as is Roumania. So would be India before long.

Politically my scheme would combine Arab, Jew, Americans and ourselves in preventing Russia using Palestine, or rather using our disunity over Palestine, as a springboard to Asia. But as it is a financial scheme out of which stem the political agreements and not the usual other-way-round kind, it would not have to go to U.N.O. except as a matter of courtesy and information. Therefore Russia could not veto for once.

An Alternative Scheme.

The leaders of world Jewry, outstanding men like Rothschild, and the Rabbis, would be invited by Great Britain and America to get their people to subscribe a Jew and Arab Friendship Loan. sufficiently large to buy out the Palestine Arabs and pay the Arab States or State which found them corresponding accommodation. The Loan would be secured on the revenues of the new Palestine, and to make repayment doubly secure the liability could be made the foundation stone of the Constitution. As it might take a considerable time for it to be subscribed, if confined to Jews alone, and as the British need for settlement so as to enable us to quit the country is urgent, a first (annual) payment proportionate to the total required could be made by the United States. That payment would be made immediately after acceptance of the plan by Arab States and Palestine and Arabs and Jews. On payment the Jews would set up their new Palestine Government, and we would clear out as soon as possible. We would get no financial advantage out of this scheme except the smallish one that subscriptions to the Loan would go through the Bank of England. Obviously it would be to the advantage of the new Palestine to make the Loan a  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent one. Whether such a low interest would attract the patriotism of American Jews seems to me doubtful. If the return was 5 per cent, and not confined to Jews, success ought to be certain and speedy.

Under this scheme paragraphs I to I7, as in the larger scheme, would stand, as do my general arguments for this peaceful solution of the problem alternative to war.

X America has no plan except the British stay until a peaceful partition of the country is accomplished.

Instead America to lend the first annual instalment on Jewish purchase of Arab claims to the whole country, provided Arab and Jews first agree to accept this situation to fighting it out.

It would be even better, but perhaps too much to hope for, that America advanced the whole purchase price against the loan to be completed in due course.

H. P. L. Chakraverty

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(15555) W.L. 43698-114 200m 2/47 G.S.S. Gp. 620


Registry  
No. E.11158/46/31

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Open. *W*

JGSB.

*Draft.*

To:  
D.P.L. Chalmers  
Esq.,  
8 Buckingham Ter-  
race,  
EDINBURGH.



OUT FILE

*FO 68 Jan 30*  
~~29th November, 1947.~~  
*3 Dec*

Sir,

I am directed etc. to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 17th, addressed to the Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which has been forwarded to this Department.

2. Your suggestions regarding the Palestine problem have been noted.

*JBMV.29*

*Jan, etc.*

*(Sgd.) B.A.B. Rumors.*

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**OUT FILE**

E 11158/46/31

Foreign Office,

S.W.1.

3rd December, 1947.

Sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Bevin to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 17th November, addressed to the Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which has been forwarded to this department.

2. Your suggestions regarding the Palestine problem have been noted.

I am, Sir,  
Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) B.A.B. Buncows.

D.P.L. Chalmers Esq.,  
8, Buckingham Terrace,  
Edinburgh.

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184  
1947  
31  
Palestine  
EASTERN  
EMMO. /G  
27

EMMO 146 K  
Brussels  
415  
Dated 26 Nov  
Received 27 Nov.

Belgian vote on Palestine

Last Paper.  
E11043

(Minutes.)  
Draft reply approved by  
sent  
sent

References.

Mr. Bevin  
Nov. 27  
(BEITH)  
JE NOV. 27

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)  
Tel) Brussels 816  
Rpd New York 4117  
✓ 27 Nov

(Action completed.)  
2F057  
11

(Index.)  
424

Next Paper.

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**FO 371 / 61795**

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Envyo

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM BRUSSELS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir G. Rendel,  
No. 415  
26th November, 1947.

D. 4.35 p.m. 26th November, 1947.

R. 5.14 p.m. 26th November, 1947

IMMEDIATE

Private and secret.

Belgian vote on Palestine.

M. Spaak told me this morning that he was in an embarrassing position over instructions to be given to Belgian representative at New York. He did not believe in partition which - at any rate unless it was enforced with United States militarisation - would, in his view, lead to much bloodshed and probably war in the Middle East and offer no permanent solution. It would be deplorable if this were to be the only result of the first reference of a question of this kind to the United Nations. He strongly disapproved of the United States and Soviet attitude of supporting partition without being ready to enforce it, though Soviet object was clear.

2. On the other hand there was no alternative proposal before United Nations and it was becoming increasingly difficult for Belgium to continue to abstain from voting and possibly thus prevent the necessary majority from being obtained for the only proposal which had been put forward. Could I give him any advice?

3. I said I thought that it would be difficult for you to give him any lead though speaking purely personally I thought it would be better to abstain than to vote against one's convictions; but at his request I eventually agreed to ask you privately and urgently whether you felt you could give him any advice.

4. He said he would be most grateful. Is there anything I can say to him.

QQQ

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# CYPHER 72

Registry  
No:

E1117014619

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Date 27/11

Despatched 12.20 PM

Draft.

~~Most Immediate~~

addressed to Brussels tel no 826 of Nov. 27 repeated for information to UK Del. New York

Del

Your tel. No 415 [of Nov 26: Palestine]

to

HMG  
HMG have consistently refrained

Brussels  
826

from commenting on the substance

Repeat New York  
(UK Del)

of the various proposals which

Most Imm.

have been before the Assembly.

No

4117.

<sup>They</sup> They have only intervened

Nov. 27.

to make clear that British  
forces could not be used

Cypher

to enforce a settlement which,

Dip. Secret

like the partition plan now

being voted on, would provoke

serious disorders in Palestine

& involve the use of force

against either side. It would

not be compatible with <sup>this</sup> this

policy for me to give advice

to the Belgian Govt. we <sup>deprecate</sup> deprecate

attempts

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W. L. ...  
22.11

SPD

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73  
attempts by any Power to  
influence others. ~~to vote~~  
Each country should vote for  
~~in any way contrary to~~  
what they consider right.

~~2. You should speak to~~

M. Spack on the above lines,  
making it clear that I much  
appreciate his asking me  
~~consulting me~~

~~2. Since however M Spack~~  
has consulted us you  
should add that we were fully  
share his views on the  
results likely to follow  
upon adoption of the majority  
plan and shall ourselves  
obtain from voting. We feel  
that in a matter of such consequence it is most  
important that member states should  
~~not~~ not to vote against  
their convictions whatever  
~~there may be.~~

Approved by the S/S

PS  
27/11

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74

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Cypher OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BRUSSELS

No. 826

27th November 1947. D. 12.20 p.m. 27th November 1947.

Repeated to U.K. Del. New York No. 4117 (Most Immediate)

MOST IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Brussels telegram No. 826 of November 27th repeated for information to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

Your telegram No. 415 [of November 26th: Palestine].

His Majesty's Government have consistently refrained from commenting on the substance of the various proposals which have been before the Assembly. They have only intervened to make clear that British forces could not be used to enforce a settlement which, like the partition plan now being voted on, would provoke serious disorders in Palestine and involve the use of force against either side. It would not be compatible with this policy for us to give advice to the Belgian Government. We deprecate attempts by any Power to influence others. Each country should vote for what it considers right.

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| 185<br>1947  | Palestine<br>EASTERN   | E11176 /G<br>27 NOV 1947 |
| E11176 /46/G<br>F.O. Min<br>Mr. Lough<br>Dated 22 Nov<br>Received 27 Nov   | Palestine: H.N.C.'s vote<br>on Security Council              |                          |
| Last Paper<br>E11170   | (Minutes)<br>10 Nov. 28                                      |                          |
| References   | See within<br>1. Copenhagen 473 - 5 Dec                      |                          |
| (Print)  | Nov 1947<br>Paris 10/11<br>Paris 8 Dec. 8                    |                          |
| (How disposed of)<br>Tel) New York 4125<br>27 Nov<br>Rptd by 10/11/47<br>C.O.<br>C.R.O.<br>N. def.<br>Mr. Lough Cab. 071<br>27 Nov<br>Tel) New York 4126<br>27 Nov<br>Rptd by 10/11/47<br>P.T.D. | 2. Prague 1121<br>5 Dec.<br>3. Prime Minister comm. 27. Nov. |                          |
| (Action completed)<br>27/29/11   | (Index)<br>4/11  |                          |
| Next Paper   |  |                          |

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 Reference: FO 371/61795

76

8) CRO  
CO  
H/Def  
Mr Luke Cab 071  
✓ 28 Nov

70) Copenhagen 612  
Panama 267  
Panama 129  
Trague 1262  
La Paz 80  
✓ 3 Dec

8) CRO  
H/Def  
Mr Luke Cab 071  
✓ 5 Dec

of 4 PM.  
PM/07/173 27. Nov

8) SdS EO.  
Minister of Def.

Tel) UK del New York  
no 4156  
29. Nov.

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Entered

Palestine : U.K. vote

the Colonial Sec. has  
 a copy of  
 Secy Mr Wright's ~~document~~  
 minute and has said  
 that he does not agree  
 with the suggestion that  
 we should vote against  
 the Majority Plan. The  
 draft tel. is not repeated  
 to Jerusalem and the Co.  
 prefer it to be done this  
 way. If Jerusalem have  
 to be informed of an  
 eventual decision to vote  
 against they would  
 wish to do this themselves

Draft tel.s submitted Sir S. Beins  
 Nov. 24  
 (BEITH)

MRB

24.11

B. Sanger  
 Koest

The S. of S. does not wish a  
 tel. sent on these lines, but  
 only

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78  
only a simple instruction to  
abstain, which he feels is the  
only consistent policy.

I attach a draft. I am  
informing C.O.

BAB Burrows

25.11

seen by Mr Wright

ret. sent

JAB

25.11

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J.G.S.B

F.O.,

24th November, 1947.

Despatched M.

Draft.

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

Addressed to U.K. Delegation, New York

U.K. Delegation,  
NEW YORK.

[No. 7] repeated for information to  
Washington ~~and to the U.K. Delegation~~

Telegram.

Your telegram No. 3513 [of November 23rd;

No. ....

Palestine].  
Personal for Minister of State ~~and~~ and Sir A. Cadogan.  
I have been considering ~~the~~ the U.K.

(Date) .....

Repeat to:—

representative should vote on the ad hoc  
Committee's partition plan, when it comes  
before the General Assembly. It is out of  
the question that we should vote for the  
proposal. The choice is whether to abstain  
or to vote against it.

2 draft tcls.

Seen by Mr Burrows

~~Distribution~~

J.G.S. Beiler  
NOV. 24

Wilson  
24.11

~~En Clair.~~ Sir O. Sargent

~~Code~~  
Cypher.

Distribution:—

Diplomatic Secret

SP

Copies to:—

2. Our attitude hitherto has been non-  
committal, and rightly so. We hoped that the  
Assembly would succeed where we had failed and  
work out a plan acceptable to both sides. It  
would be a logical extension of this attitude  
for us to abstain from voting in the Assembly  
and that is what all parties presumably  
expect us to do.

3. If we abstain, the Arab countries will  
probably be reasonably content that we have  
not voted for the plan. The moderate Jews will  
probably not be unduly critical of abstention,  
which they will have discounted before hand.  
Apart from the extreme Zionists we may reason-  
ably expect that there will be no violent  
reaction one way or the other.

4. It is not easy to weigh up likely  
reactions to an adverse vote by us. The Jews  
would/

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Reference:—  
**FO 371/61795**

30

would undoubtedly react strongly. If a partition plan were rejected they would no doubt allege that this was due to our attitude. If and when a Jewish State comes into being our relations with it would be embittered by our having voted adversely. As to American opinion, antagonism towards us amongst extreme Zionists would presumably increase, if that is possible; whereas moderate Jewish opinion might swing against us. But it seems doubtful from here whether the rest of American opinion would be very strongly against us, at least for long, particularly since the Russians are associated with the partition plan. On the other hand the Arab countries would warmly welcome an adverse vote and our position throughout the Arab world would be strengthened, rash though it might be to count on any concrete expression of Arab gratitude. As regards general reactions you have already reported that we are being much criticised for our negative attitude in the United Nations discussions. If we were to go to the length of voting against a scheme which had the support of the majority (even if not a two-thirds majority) of the United Nations our critics would inevitably claim that we had not been sincere in asking the Assembly's advice in the first place. Suspicions which are already held that we are in fact only interested in obtaining our strategical objectives in Palestine and are using reference to the United Nations as an elaborate smoke screen for this purpose, would be considerably strengthened.

5. From the practical point of view it is clear/

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3148 WL 26469/137 50m 9/46 (51) F.&S.

*the Colonial Secretary on the other hand is in favour of maintaining our policy of abstention*

81  
clear that the arrival of a United Nations Commission in Palestine would gravely complicate our withdrawal and, as this is now an integral part of the plan, it would not suit us for the plan to receive a two-thirds majority.

Moreover, we are more likely to be able to <sup>achieve</sup> ~~leave~~ the kind of settlement that will suit us in the course of our withdrawal if there is no Assembly recommendation in favour of partition than if there is one. <sup>para. 5 of</sup> [See my telegram No. 3875]

6. It is extremely difficult to judge exactly where the balance of advantage lies but I am inclined to feel that, as we think the plan is a bad one which will have dangerous consequences, we should be forthright and vote against it, with the corresponding advantage to our position in Arab countries. I shall be glad of your very early comments before making a final decision.

7. If we decide to vote against it seems important that we should let our attitude be known beforehand so as to obtain full advantage from our action. <sup>Sir A. Cadogan</sup> ~~we~~ would have discretion as to how this should be done.

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Draft. Tel.

Washington

en clair

~~Dept. No. 1~~

Mr. Bennett  
NW. 24

Jim Bennett

MOSC

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Washington  
No. ... of ...  
Repeated for information  
to UK Delegation, N. York

My tel. no. to  
UK Del., N. York [of  
Palestine]

Please telegraph  
your views most urgently.

82

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27 1947

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83

En176

PALESTINE

No formal decision has yet been taken by H. M. G. on the question of their vote in the Assembly on the Majority (partition) proposal for Palestine.

2. It is out of the question that we should vote for the proposal. The choice is whether to abstain or to vote against.

3. Our attitude throughout the Committee discussions has been non-committal, and rightly so. We hoped that the Assembly would succeed where we had failed and work out a plan acceptable to both sides. It would be a logical extension of this attitude for us to abstain from voting in the Assembly, and that is what all parties presumably expect us to do.

4. If we abstain, the Arab countries will probably be reasonably content that we have not voted for the plan. The moderate Jews will probably not be unduly critical of abstention, which they will more or less have discounted beforehand. In fact apart from the extreme Zionists we may reasonably expect that there will be no violent reaction one way or the other.

5. On the other hand we believe the Majority plan to be a bad one and unfair to the Arabs, and that its adoption will entail risk of disturbances on a large scale. This may play into the hands of Russia, and cut right across our general policy in the Middle East. Since we believe the plan to be a bad one, there is a good deal to be said for having the strength and courage of our convictions and voting against it.

6. A vote against the plan, even if we did not make our attitude clear beforehand, might possibly affect the prospects of adoption of the plan. Adoption requires two-thirds of those present and voting, in other words two-thirds of x votes. If we vote against, the vote required for adoption will be two-thirds of x ~~plus~~ one votes. If we go further and let it be known beforehand, whether privately or otherwise, that we are going to vote against, it is possible that foreknowledge of our attitude might influence some other governments either to abstain or to vote against.

7. The reactions to an adverse vote need careful weighing. The Jews would no doubt react strongly. They would not merely criticise us, but if a partition plan were rejected would no doubt allege that this was due to our attitude. If and when a Jewish State came into being our relations with it might be embittered by our having voted adversely. The reaction of American opinion is hard to gauge. Antagonism towards us by extreme Zionists would presumably be increased, if that is possible; more moderate Jewish opinion might swing against us or further against us. But I doubt, and Mr. Rundall agrees, whether the rest of American opinion would be very strongly against

us/

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E 10538/46/C.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

85

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

Top Secret.

CYPHER/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3,875.

12th November, 1947.

D: 10.33 p.m. 12th November, 1947.

Repeated to: Washington No. 11711 (Immediate),  
Jerusalem.

MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Your telegrams Nos. 3,270 and 3,308 [of November 8th and 10th: Palestine].

Following for Minister of State and Sir A. Cadogan from Foreign Secretary.

American-Soviet plan does not alter our fundamental position set out in my telegram No. 3,852 [of November 11th], but it makes it all the more necessary to emphasise certain points of our position, particularly to American and Dominion representatives and, at your discretion, at appropriate moments in Committee discussions.

2. Our basic position is that we will not allow British administration or troops to be used directly or indirectly by the United Nations in enforcing a settlement, which is going to provoke serious opposition in Palestine or in neighbouring countries. This means that if a United Nations commission is in Palestine taking preparatory steps for an enforced settlement, British administration and troops would not continue to exercise administrative responsibility or to keep law and order except for their own protection in the process of withdrawal. The conditions on which failing an agreed settlement we would be prepared to continue administrative responsibility until a date near to that on which our troops could be withdrawn are stated at the end of paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 3,852. Our willingness to do that would however be affected if the United Nations decided to send a Commission to Palestine to enforce a settlement. In those circumstances we should not be prepared to continue administrative responsibility unless there were a truce to be observed by all parties pending the arrival of the Commission, whereupon or very shortly indeed thereafter we would relinquish administrative responsibility. We do not therefore necessarily agree with 2 (b) in your telegram No. 3,308. Circumstances may arise in which we should wish to liquidate our responsibilities over large parts of the country at a very early date. In other words, if United

/Nations

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86

- 2 -

Nations wish to send a Commission to enforce a settlement to which both parties did not agree, we should have to insist that it should not arrive in Palestine until after, or until very shortly before, we relinquished administrative responsibility; or, if they insisted on sending a Commission at once, we should have to relinquish our administrative responsibility at once also.

3. I realise that this sort of attitude may seem unconstructive and leads on to the question asked in your telegram No. 3,270 whether we would prefer that the Assembly agreed on no recommendations.

4. It seems most difficult for us to take any active part in steering the Assembly towards acceptable recommendations. The difficulty is that if we start talking about the substance of proposals, we shall surely be driven step by step to proposing a plan of our own. We could reply with something on the lines of the earlier "Bevin" or "Morrison" plans, but if we did so, we should then be back in exactly the position we have tried to avoid of sponsoring a proposal of our own, against which all concerned would no doubt immediately divert their energies.

5. I do not feel however that at present I can accept your assumption that we must exclude all possibility of a recommendation providing for non-British enforcement; but if this assumption were correct and we were faced with a choice between recommendations involving enforcement of law and order by British arms and no recommendation at all, the latter is obviously preferable. Even if there were no recommendation at all, we should, as you say in your telegram No. 3,270, inevitably influence the final solution by our manner of withdrawing, but this would give us far more latitude and would be far less likely to lay us open to damaging suspicions. It would be better to withdraw in our own way thus possibly influencing the de facto settlement rather than to tie ourselves to a principle and publicly put a solution on these lines forward for everyone to shoot at. The above is for your highly confidential information and should not on any account be used for public statement or discussion with other delegations. We must be extremely careful not to give the impression that it would suit us if the Assembly should fail to make any recommendations, though I agree that we could go as far as paragraph 9 of your telegram No. 3,270.

6. To sum up, we must make it clear, particularly to the Americans, that we cannot be used as the instrument of United Nations in imposing a settlement not acceptable to both Jews and Arabs or keeping order while a commission imposes it. If this results in the Assembly failing to agree on any recommendation, while that result would in some ways be regrettable, we feel that it is from our point of view preferable to a settlement which we should be expected, and must refuse, to enforce.

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Ho. Eastern

87

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Cypher/OTP.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 5517.

D. 12.42 p.m. 24th November 1947.

24th November 1947. R. 5.56 p.m. 24th November 1947.

Repeated to: Jerusalem and  
Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

GIANT.

SECRET.

Your telegram No.4061.

Following for Sargent from Cadogan.

Palestine.

United States Delegation are now undoubtedly putting pressure on other Delegations to support partition and are trying to rush matters to a final vote with as little discussion as possible. If these tactics succeed, final vote in Plenary Session may take place on Wednesday.

2. We are proposing to re-state our position in Plenary. We await your instructions on use of our vote there, but we hope that you appreciate that, after our strictly neutral attitude hitherto, it would be extremely difficult for us to do anything other than abstain.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Palestine as my telegram No.250.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office, for re-transmission to Palestine.]

W:W:W:W:W

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Registry  
No. EM 176/409

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Open.

B. A. B. B.

Draft.  
New York.

(UK Del) (A)

Telegram.

No. 4125  
(Date) 27/11/47

Repeat to:—

Washington ✓  
No  
Jerusalem ✓

Minister in  
C. R. Reley comms.  
PB  
27/11

~~Explain~~  
~~Copy~~  
Cypher.

Distribution:—

Diplomatic Secret

Copies to:—

C.O.  
C.R.O.  
Min of Defense  
Mr. Herke  
(Lab. Office)  
28/11.

# CYPHER 88

27 November 1947.

Despatched 5 15 P M.

TOP SECRET

MOST IMMEDIATE

tel no 4125 of 27<sup>d</sup> Nov.

Addressed to U.K. Delegation, New York. <sup>for information</sup>  
Repeated to Washington and Jerusalem.  
Palestine.

Ministers have now given further consideration to more detailed plans for withdrawal from Palestine on the basis of withdrawal being complete by August 1st, 1948. My immediately following telegram contains, for your own confidential information, a summary of the plan of withdrawal which has now been agreed.

2. You will observe that this plan requires the maintenance of the civil administration and the Mandate until 15th May, 1948 over all Palestine (except that in certain circumstances the civil administration or some parts of it may be withdrawn at an earlier date from the <sup>GAZA</sup> Gaza civil district).

3. If the United Nations adopt a partition scheme involving the appointment of a commission as proposed by Sub-Committee <sup>one</sup> I. H.M.G. consider it essential that the arrival of the commission in Palestine should be planned to fit in with our plan of withdrawal. That means that we should not want the commission to arrive until the beginning of May at the earliest.

4./

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(356) Wt. 48697-140 100m 3147 G.S.S. Gp 620

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**FO 371/61795**

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4. We consider that it would not be possible to maintain the Mandate and civil administration for a longer period than 15 days after the arrival of the commission in Palestine. ~~Premature~~ arrival of commission <sup>is bound to</sup> would have a disturbing effect on the Arab population and ~~would therefore~~ <sup>if it arrived before we are ready to hand over to it this</sup> mean abandonment of our plan of withdrawal and substitution of a new plan which would involve disastrous losses of stores and which Ministers are not prepared to accept.

5. ~~We should therefore hope that if a decision is taken in favour of partition the United Nations commission would be prepared to negotiate with us on a mutually convenient date for their arrival in Palestine.~~ <sup>It would clearly be in our mutual interest to come to an arrangement about this</sup> ~~Ministers feel that it would be as much in their interest as in ours to do this.~~ <sup>In fact,</sup>

6. In order to pave the way for negotiations of this kind Ministers thought that it would be useful if you were to approach informally <sup>and privately</sup> the leaders of the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South African Delegations. <sup>privately</sup> You should make it clear that H.M.G. ~~do not in any way desire to~~ <sup>are not in any way attempting</sup> influence their attitude towards the question of partition and that H.M.G. ~~wish to leave them com-~~ <sup>fully recognize that it is entirely for them</sup> pletely free to vote as they think right on this question. H.M.G. feel, however, that they should know what the consequences would be of a premature arrival of the United Nations commission in Palestine and would be glad if they could do anything to ensure that, should the decision be in favour of partition and the

despatch/

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despatch of a United Nations commission to Palestine, the United Nations commission would be willing to agree with H.M.G. on a mutually convenient date for the arrival of the commission in Palestine.

7. Ministers thought that there should be no approach to the Indian or Pakistan Delegations on this matter.

8. Apart from the communication to Commonwealth delegations authorised in paragraph 6 above, you should not make any statement, in the Assembly or otherwise, containing any of the above information before the final vote is taken. As soon as the vote has been taken, and if it is in favour of partition, you should make a short statement reserving the right of H.M.G. to negotiate detailed plans for the commission's arrival to fit in with our withdrawal plan, without at that stage giving details of the latter. You should report as soon as possible with whom and in what circumstances you will have to negotiate.

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Nov 27  
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TOP SECRET  
Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 4125

D. 5.15 p.m. 27th November, 1947

27th November, 1947

Repeated Washington No. 12254,  
Jerusalem

MOST IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation, New York  
telegram No. 4125 of 27th November repeated for information  
to Washington and Jerusalem.

Palestine.

Ministers have now given further consideration to more detailed plans for withdrawal from Palestine on the basis of withdrawal being complete by August 1st, 1948. My immediately following telegram contains, for your own confidential information, a summary of the plan of withdrawal which has now been agreed.

2. You will observe that this plan requires the maintenance of the civil administration and the Mandate until 15th May, 1948 over all Palestine (except that in certain circumstances the civil administration or some parts of it may be withdrawn at an earlier date from the Gaza civil district).

3. If the United Nations adopt a partition scheme involving the appointment of a commission as proposed by Sub-Committee I. His Majesty's Government consider it essential that the arrival of the commission in Palestine should be planned to fit in with our plan of withdrawal. That means that we should not want the commission to arrive until the beginning of May at the earliest.

4. We consider that it would not be possible to maintain the Mandate and civil administration for a longer period than 15 days after the arrival of the commission in Palestine. Arrival of commission is bound to have a disturbing effect on the Arab population and if therefore it arrived before we are ready to hand over to it this would mean abandonment of our plan of withdrawal and substitution of a new plan which would involve disastrous losses of stores and which Ministers are not prepared to accept.

5. If therefore a decision is taken in favour of partition we should be ready to discuss with the United Nations Commission a mutually convenient date for their arrival in Palestine. It would clearly be in our mutual interest to come to an arrangement about this.

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6. In order to pave the way for negotiations of this kind Ministers thought that it would be useful if you were to approach informally and privately the leaders of the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South African delegations. You should make it clear that His Majesty's Government are not in any way attempting to influence their attitude towards the question of partition and that His Majesty's Government fully recognise that it is entirely for them to vote as they think right on this question. His Majesty's Government feel, however, that they should know what the consequences would be of a premature arrival of the United Nations Commission in Palestine and would be glad if they could do anything to ensure that, should the decision be in favour of partition and the despatch of a United Nations Commission to Palestine, the United Nations Commission would be willing to agree with His Majesty's Government on a mutually convenient date for the arrival of the commission in Palestine.

7. Ministers thought that there should be no approach to the Indian or Pakistan delegations on this matter.

8. Apart from the communication to Commonwealth delegations authorised in paragraph 6 above, you should not make any statement, in the Assembly or otherwise containing any of the above information before the final vote is taken. As soon as the vote has been taken, and if it is in favour of partition, you should make a short statement reserving the right of His Majesty's Government to negotiate detailed plans for the commission's arrival to fit in with our withdrawal plan, without at that stage giving details of the latter. You should report as soon as possible with whom and in what circumstances you will have to negotiate.

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TOP SECRET

MOST IMMEDIATE 5-10 B 111

Add UK Del N. York No 412467 for info to Jerusalem

My info. Washington

93

Following is summary of the plan of withdrawal:-

Top Secret  
Draft tel.  
UK Del.  
N. York  
Cypher

(a) Military Withdrawal. Provision is made for series of clear-cut backward moves, northwards from Egyptian frontier, designed to reduce the possibilities of clashes between our troops and Arabs in Arab areas. Areas to be evacuated as follows:-

Phase I

Gaza civil district: by 29th February

Phase II

Jerusalem, Lydda and part of Samaria: by 31st May

Phase III

Remainder of Samaria and Galilee: by 30th June

Phase IV

The remaining enclave round Haifa: by 31st July.

Evacuation of stores, through Haifa and by land to Egypt, will start on 1st December. Care will be taken to cause as little dislocation as possible to trade (particularly citrus trade) and economy of Palestine by overloading rail and port facilities. It is estimated that, even under most favourable conditions, we shall lose nearly 150,000 tons of useful stores.

(b) Withdrawal of Civil Administration. Civil administration would be maintained in Gaza district for as long as possible after military evacuation, with object of safeguarding the routes to Egypt. Existing civil administration would be maintained over the rest of the country until ~~some date~~ towards end of Phase II, i.e. 15th May, when Mandate would be terminated.

Dip. Secret

Repeat Washington  
NO  
Jerusalem

**CYPHER**

Copies:

CRD

CO

Min of Defence

Mr Lusk (Asst. Officer)

4.5 pm

28/11

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Thereafter it is contemplated that certain civil administrative staffs would be retained in areas still occupied by our troops and would give all assistance possible to military authority, who would control occupied areas only to extent needed for efficient conduct of withdrawal.

2. Under this plan it will be impossible for military to take any steps in Palestine to prevent illegal immigration after 1st February, though Navy will do their best to ~~deal with~~ <sup>continue to</sup> intercept ships. No announcement of any change of policy will be made.

BAIBB

217.11

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~RESTRICTED~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

J.G.S.B.

# CYPHER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET

November 1947. 97

OUT FILE

Despatched 2.55p M.

Draft.

COPENHAGEN  
MANILA  
PANAMA  
PRAGUE  
LA PAZ  
Telegram.

612 ✓  
267 ✓  
129 ✓  
126 ✓  
80 ✓

Addressed to Copenhagen telegram No. 612

3500 407, and to Manila, Panama, Prague,  
La Paz, repeated for information to U.K.  
Washington  
Delegation, New York, and Jerusalem.

No. ....

Palestine N.P. I am repeating to you telegrams

(Date) Dec 3<sup>rd</sup>

Nos. 4125 and 4126 to the U.K. Delegation, New

Repeat to :-

York, about the British plan for withdrawal and

U.K. Delegation,  
New York. 4185

the arrival of a United Nations Commission. You

Washington 12471

will observe that it is desirable that the

Jerusalem

Commission should not arrive in Palestine until

shortly before the date proposed for the termination of British Civil

Administration ~~in the beginning of~~ <sup>in</sup> May.

Co. Conrad

2. Please explain the position of

H.S. Bevin

His Majesty's Government <sup>in confidence</sup> to the Government to

Dec. 2

which you are accredited, and request <sup>them</sup> in view of

B.A. Burrows

the importance of maintaining peaceful conditions

~~Mr. Clark~~ 2.12

during the transitional period of withdrawal in

~~Mr. Beale~~

Palestine, to instruct <sup>them</sup> the representatives <sup>at</sup> of the

Cypher.

with night 2.12

United Nations to cooperate to the fullest <sup>possible</sup> extent

Distribution: Sir O. Sargent

with Sir A. Cadogan in working out the plans of the

new Commission, on which they are to be

DIPLOMATIC SECRET

represented.

B. Bevin  
Dec 2

Copies to :-

Colonial Office,  
Commonwealth  
Relations Office.  
Ministry of Defence.  
Cabinet Office  
(Mr. Luke) 5/2.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(13556) 987-140 100m 3/47 G.S.St. Gp 620

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98

E.11176/46/G.

Top Secret.

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC SECRET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO:

|                   |                 |
|-------------------|-----------------|
| <u>COPENHAGEN</u> | <u>NO. 612</u>  |
| <u>MANILA</u>     | <u>NO. 267</u>  |
| <u>PANAMA</u>     | <u>NO. 129</u>  |
| <u>PRAGUE</u>     | <u>NO. 1262</u> |
| <u>LA PAZ</u>     | <u>NO. 80</u>   |

December 3rd, 1947. 2.55.p.m. December 3rd, 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York No. 4185,  
Washington No. 12471,  
Jerusalem.

Immediate.

Top Secret.

Addressed to Copenhagen telegram No. 612 of 3rd December 1947, and to Manila, Panama, Prague, La Paz, repeated for information to United Kingdom Delegation, New York, and Washington and Jerusalem.

Palestine.

I am repeating to you telegrams Nos. 4125 and 4126 to the United Kingdom Delegation, New York, about the British plan for withdrawal and the arrival of a United Nations Commission. You will observe that it is desirable that the Commission should not arrive in Palestine until shortly before the date proposed for the termination of British Civil Administration in May.

2. Please explain the position of His Majesty's Government in confidence to the Government to which you are accredited and request them, in view of the importance of maintaining peaceful conditions during the transitional period of withdrawal in Palestine, to instruct their representatives at the United Nations to cooperate to the fullest possible extent with Sir A. Cadogan in working out the plans of the new Commission, on which they are to be represented.

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EM1146/46

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM COPENHAGEN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

99

Mr. Rose  
No. 473

5th December, 1947

D. 2.33 p.m. 5th December, 1947  
R. 3.32 p.m. 5th December, 1947

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York

IMPORTANT  
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 473 of December 5th repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York Central.

Your telegram No. 612.

I spoke accordingly to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His initial reaction was favourable but he promised nothing.

Foreign Office please repeat to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 2.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York.]

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En clair

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

100

FROM PRAGUE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir P. Nichols  
No. 1121

D. 9.05 a.m. December 6th, 1947.

December 5th, 1947.

R. 10.11 a.m. December 6th, 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 1121 of  
December 5th repeated United Kingdom Delegation New  
York.

Your telegram No. 612 to Copenhagen. E/S

Instructions were carried out to-day.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom  
Delegation New York as my telegram No. 10.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation,  
New York]

SSSSS

sp in dept  
spare ref  
attached.

Mrs. Bennett  
Dec. 9

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EM 172/46/9

PM. 47/173.

27/4/47.

101

Draft Minute from  
Secretary of State

PRIME MINISTER

As a result of the Defence Committee meeting this morning, we are authorising Sir A. Cadogan to inform the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South African delegations of our hope that the United Nations commission, if this is set up as a result of a vote in favour of partition in the Assembly, will be willing to agree with H.M.G. on a mutually convenient date for the arrival of the commission in Palestine. I feel it would be desirable to inform Mr. Marshall frankly of our position on similar lines, in the hope that he would send suitable instructions to the United States delegation. I would propose, therefore, subject to your consent, to show him a summary of our withdrawal plan and to inform him of our earnest hope that the arrival of the commission may be delayed to fit in with it. The Chiefs of Staff have no objection to this.

I should hope to be able to take action with Mr. Marshall to-day if possible.

I am sending copies of this minute to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Minister of Defence.

*Handwritten signature*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*Copied to  
S/S for Colonies,  
Minister of  
Defence.*

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FO 371/61795

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102

P.M./27/473

PRIME MINISTER

As a result of the Defence Committee meeting this morning, we are authorising Sir A. Cadogan to inform the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South African delegations of our hope that the United Nations commission, if this is set up as a result of a vote in favour of partition in the Assembly, will be willing to agree with His Majesty's Government on a mutually convenient date for the arrival of the commission in Palestine. I feel it would be desirable to inform Mr. Marshall frankly of our position on similar lines, in the hope that he would send suitable instructions to the United States delegation. I would propose, therefore, subject to your consent, to show him a summary of our withdrawal plan and to inform him of our earnest hope that the arrival of the commission may be delayed to fit in with it. The Chiefs of Staff have no objection to this.

2. I should hope to be able to take action with

Mr. Marshall/

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Reference:-

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103

Mr. Marshall today if possible.

3. I am sending copies of this minute to the  
Secretary of State for the Colonies and the  
Minister of Defence.

(Sd.) ERNEST BEVIN

27th November, 1947.

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FO 371 / 61795

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS



10, DOWNING STREET,  
WHITEHALL,

28th November, 1947.

COPY OF MINUTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER.

Reference: The Foreign Secretary's minute to  
the Prime Minister, P.M./47/173 of  
the 27th November, 1947.

"I agree.

C.R.A.

27.11.47."

E11176

Action taken .

Eastern Dept.

M  
20/11.

Copy also sent to:

- 1) Secretary of State for the Colonies
- 2) Minister of Defence.

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Registry  
No.

B. A. B. B.

Draft.

U.K. Delegation,  
New York.

Telegram.

No. 4156  
Dated. 29. Nov.

Repeat to:

Washington

12367 Immediate

Cypher

Diplomatic Secret.

*B. B. Burton*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

29 November, 1947.

Despatched 9.15 P.M.

TOP SECRET

IMMEDIATE

105  
CYPHER

Addressed to U.K. Delegation,  
New York. *See No 4156 29/11* Repeated to Washington *for information*

My telegram No. 4125 [of 27th  
November: Palestine].

Memorandum has been handed to Mr. Marshall containing outline of withdrawal plan and calling attention to difficulties likely to be caused by premature arrival of United Nations commission in the event of partition being voted. Memorandum goes on to suggest that it would be most helpful if the United States representative at United Nations could be instructed to use his influence to ensure that the commission were ready to come to an arrangement with us on lines which would fit in with our plans, i.e. that it should not arrive in Palestine before May 1st.

2. We

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106

2. We understand that Mr Marshall has telegraphed substance of memo without comment to State Dept. HM Emb. will no doubt be able to inform you <sup>of</sup> ~~whether~~ ~~what action~~ State Dept's ~~are~~ ~~but~~ reaction & you will then be able to judge whether & if so when to approach US Delegation.

[Copy sent to M & Sect]

JAB

29.11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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E 107

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].  
Top Secret  
Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

No. 4156 (To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

29th November, 1947. D.9.15 p.m. 29th November, 1947.  
Repeated to Washington No. 12367

IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York telegram No. 4156 29th November, repeated to Washington for information.

My telegram No. 4125 [of 27th November: Palestine].

Memorandum has been handed to Mr. Marshall containing outline of withdrawal plan and calling attention to difficulties likely to be caused by premature arrival of United Nations commission in the event of partition being voted. Memorandum goes on to suggest that it would be most helpful if the United States representative at United Nations could be instructed to use his influence to ensure that the commission were ready to come to an arrangement with us on lines which would fit in with our plans, i.e. that it should not arrive in Palestine before May 1st.

2. We understand that Mr. Marshall has telegraphed substance of memorandum without comment to State Department. His Majesty's Embassy will no doubt be able to inform you of State Department's reaction and you will then be able to judge whether and if so when to approach United States Delegation.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

B B B

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| 187<br>1947<br>31   | Palestine<br>EASTERN                        | 108<br>E11291 / G<br>21 DEC 1947 |
| E11291 / 46 / C<br>Cabinet Offices.<br>Conclusions (4)<br>Poth H. H.<br>Item 2b.<br>November 20th | Partition of Palestine                      |                                  |
| Last Paper<br>E11290.   | (Minutes)<br>Cabinet is on Dec. 4 JB Dec. 2 |                                  |
| References  |   |                                  |
| (Print)   |   |                                  |
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| <p>1947</p>  | <p>Palestine</p> <p>EASTERN</p>                        | <p>EU292 / G</p> <p>1 DEC 1947</p> |
| <p>EU292/46/C</p> <p>Cabinet Offices.</p> <p>COS (47) Middle East</p> <p>Item 6.</p> <p>November 24th.</p> | <p>Withdrawal of British Forces<br/>from Palestine</p> |                                    |
| <p>Last Paper</p> <p>EU292</p>   | <p>(Minutes)</p> <p>10 Dec. 2</p>                      |                                    |
| <p>References</p>  |  |                                    |
| <p>(Print)</p>   |  |                                    |
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1 DEC 1947

Eastern Dept.

C.O.S.(47) 146<sup>HL</sup> Mtg.

E 46

26 Nov 1947

E 11292

For (Enter)

III

6. PALESTINE -- MODIFIED PLAN FOR WITHDRAWAL

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(47) 145th Mtg. Min.1)

THE COMMITTEE referred to a telegram<sup>x</sup> from the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East containing their views and recommendations on a modified plan put forward by the Official Committee on Palestine to meet the possibility that a commission might be sent to Palestine by the United Nations before we had time to complete the withdrawal of our forces from Palestine.

IN DISCUSSION, the following points were made in support of the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, views that the modification to their plan put forward by the Official Committee on Palestine was impracticable:-

- (a) By withdrawing at an earlier date from Jerusalem and the area to the north, the possibility of our coming into conflict with the Arabs would be increased and the period during which such conflict might take place would be increased by about three months.
- (b) Once our forces had withdrawn to the coastal area, G.O.C. Palestine would find it almost impossible to avoid becoming involved in the civil administration of that area, and he would not have available the necessary large number of trained personnel required to be responsible for such matters as the maintenance of law and order, transportation, public health, labour and food distribution, even if the British element of the present Government of Palestine was available to help him.
- (c) Rail communications ran parallel to and on the perimeter which our forces would be holding when they had withdrawn to the coastal area. The railway would almost certainly be raided at intervals along its length by Arabs thus interfering with the Citrus traffic and preventing orderly withdrawal of the stores from inland.
- (d) G.O.C. Palestine could not be responsible for preventing Jewish illegal immigrants from landing on the foreshore and at the same time implement the withdrawal.
- (e) Under a modified plan we should be unable to withdraw from Palestine little more than our troops, unit equipment and unit vehicles. Much valuable and irreplaceable equipment, particularly workshops equipment would have to be abandoned and destroyed. The effect of this on our prestige in the Middle East would be serious at a time when the maintenance of that prestige was all important.
- (f) In order to implement the modified plan there would have to be an increase in the number of our troops in Egypt, beyond that envisaged under the original plan.

x 188/CCL

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113

release of Jewish illegal immigrants held in Cyprus, however, required study and it might well be found the operation could be carried out in collaboration with the Jews in Palestine. This might be a further factor in influencing the Jews in discouraging illegal immigration at that stage.

The official Committee on Palestine proposed to prepare a draft report to the Defence Committee, for consideration later in the week, and if the Chiefs of Staff so wished, the telegram from the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East<sup>x</sup> could be annexed to that report and statement included in the report on the implications of a modified plan, drawing particular attention to the loss of stores involved upon which he hoped to be able to indicate the extent, if possible giving an indication of the value; and to the considerations affecting the availability of shipping.

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF concurred in this proposal and undertook to brief their representatives on the official Committee for Palestine accordingly.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Strongly supported the views of the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, that their original plan in telegram 186/CCL be adhered to and concurred in their views on the implications of a modified plan outlined in their telegram 188/CCL.
- (b) Took note that the Official Committee on Palestine would bear in mind their views above in preparing their report to the Defence Committee.

x 188/CCL

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| <p>189</p> <p>17</p>  | <p>Palestine</p> <p>EASTERN</p>                        | <p>E11293 / G</p> <p>7 DEC 1947</p> |
| <p>E11293 / 46 / G</p> <p>Cabinet Offices.</p> <p>COS(44) with. Mtg.</p> <p>Item 6.</p> <p>November 27th.</p> | <p>Withdrawal of British Forces<br/>from Palestine</p> |                                     |
| <p>Last Paper</p> <p>E11292</p>   | <p>(Minutes)</p> <p>JB Dec. 2</p>                      |                                     |
| <p>References</p>   |  |                                     |
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